O INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DO USUÁRIO VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITORBugarin, Mauricio Soares2023-07-172023-07-172009https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/5804This article presents a game-theoretic model of voting and political bargaining where voters have two instruments for controlling politicians: vote splitting and reelection. It shows that vote splitting may totally offset the traditional reelection control mechanism, which suggests an application to the American 2004 Presidential elections. When reelection is useful, voters tend to have more flexible reelection criteria when they believe the true state of the world is likely to be unfavorable. Furthermore, there will be government shutdown with positive probability. Political gridlocks constitute an information revelation mechanism that improves subsequent control. The model is robust to voters’ ideological heterogeneity.30 p.DigitalInglêsworking paperElectoral controlreelectionvote splittinggovernment shutdownideologyBEWP 068/2009