GUILHERME DA FRANCA COUTO FERNANDES DE ALMEIDA2024-09-192024-09-1920242633-68472633-6855https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/6969One persistent question in jurisprudence relates to the role of morality in the concept of law. For instance, consider the question of whether unjust statutes are laws. Legal positivists say that they’re laws in every relevant sense, while natural lawyers say that they’re not. This article considers a different answer inspired by recent findings in experimental philosophy: there is one relevant sense in which unjust statutes are laws, but also a different relevant sense in which they aren’t. After considering the ways in which this alternative differs from some of the mainstream theories in general jurisprudence, the article argues that it provides more elegant solutions to two problems that have puzzled legal philosophers in the past: the paradox of customary international law and the shifts in legal discourse over history.Digitalp. 1 - 24enGeneral jurisprudenceNatural lawPositivismDual character conceptsExperimental jurisprudencejournal article10.4337/jlp.2024.01.01