O INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DO USUÁRIO VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITOR.Hannikainen, Ivar R.Tobia, Kevin P.Almeida, Guilherme da F. C. F. deStruchiner, NoelKneer, MarkusBystranowski, PiotrDranseika, ViliusStrohmaier, NiekBensinger, SamanthaDolinina, KristinaJanik, BartoszLauraityte, EgleLaakasuo, MichaelLiefgreen, AliceNeiders, IvarsPróchnicki, MaciejRosas, AlejandroSundvall, JukkaŻuradzki, Tomasz2024-01-242024-01-2420221091-6490https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/6380A cross-cultural survey experiment revealed a dominant tendency to rely on a rule’s letter over its spirit when deciding which behaviors violate the rule. This tendency varied markedly across (k = 15) countries, owing to variation in the impact of moral appraisals on judgments of rule violation. Compared with laypeople, legal experts were more inclined to disregard their moral evaluations of the acts altogether and consequently exhibited stronger textualist tendencies. Finally, we evaluated a plausible mechanism for the emergence of textualism: in a two-player coordination game, incentives to coordinate in the absence of communication reinforced participants’ adherence to rules’ literal meaning. Together, these studies (total n = 5,794) help clarify the origins and allure of textualism, especially in the law. Within heterogeneous communities in which members diverge in their moral appraisals involving a rule’s purpose, the rule’s literal meaning provides a clear focal point—an identifiable point of agreement enabling coordinated interpretation among citizens, lawmakers, and judges.8 p.DigitalInglêsMoral judgmentLegal decision makingCoordinationCross-cultural researchjournal article10.1073/pnas.220653111944119