Navegando por Autor "Hannikainen, Ivar Rodriguez"

Agora exibindo 1 - 2 de 2
  • Imagem de Miniatura
    Artigo Científico
    Do Formalist Judges Abide By Their Abstract Principles? A Two-Country Study in Adjudication
    (2021) Bystranowski, Piotr; Janik, Bartosz; Próchnicki, Maciej; Hannikainen, Ivar Rodriguez; GUILHERME DA FRANCA COUTO FERNANDES DE ALMEIDA; Struchiner, Noel
    Recent literature in experimental philosophy has postulated the existence of the abstract/concrete paradox (ACP): the tendency to activate inconsistent intuitions (and generate inconsistent judgment) depending on whether a problem to be analyzed is framed in abstract terms or is described as a concrete case. One recent study supports the thesis that this effect influences judicial decision-making, including decision-making by professional judges, in areas such as interpretation of constitutional principles and application of clear-cut rules. Here, following the existing literature in legal theory, we argue that the susceptibility to such an effect might depend on whether decision-makers operate in a legal system characterized by the formalist or particularist approach to legal interpretation, with formalist systems being less susceptible to the effect. To test this hypothesis, we compare the results of experimental studies on ACP run on samples from two countries differing in legal culture: Poland and Brazil. The lack of significant differences between those results (also for professional legal decision-makers) suggests that ACP is a robust effect in the legal context.
  • Imagem de Miniatura
    Rule is a dual character concept
    (2023) Almeida, Guilherme da Franca Couto Fernandes de; Struchiner, Noel; Hannikainen, Ivar Rodriguez
    Recent experimental work revealed that rule violation judgments are sensitive to morality. For instance: when someone blamelessly violates a rule's text, about half of the participants say that the rule was violated, with the remainder saying that it wasn't. Why is that so? Current evidence is compatible with three distinct explanations. According to the pragmatic view, rule violation judgments pragmatically imply judgments of blame. Hence, the results don't tell us anything about the concept of rule itself. Instead, they are simply caused by conversational pragmatics. On the other hand, the mixed character view states that the concept of rule simultaneously combines text and purpose into a single criterion. Finally, the dual character view states that the concept of rule is similar to the concepts of scientist and father. These concepts have two distinct sets of criteria, each sufficient to determine one sense in which the concept applies. One of the criteria is descriptive, while the other is normative. In this paper, we report the results of four studies designed to adjudicate between these alternatives. Studies 1A and 1B find results that are incompatible with the pragmatic view, while Study 2 shows that the concept of rule behaves in a way that is notably different than some mixed character concepts on a linguistic test. Finally, Studies 3–5 support the idea that the concept of rule has a dual character. We consider the jurisprudential implications of each alternative.