GUILHERME DA FRANCA COUTO FERNANDES DE ALMEIDA
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Artigo Científico Are There Cross-Cultural Legal Principles? Modal Reasoning Uncovers Procedural Constraints on Law(2021) Tobia, Kevin P.; GUILHERME DA FRANCA COUTO FERNANDES DE ALMEIDA; Donelson, Raff; Dranseika, Vilius; Kneer, Markus; Strohmaier, Niek; Bystranowski, Piotr; Dolinina, Kristina; Janik, Bartosz; Keo, Sothie; Lauraityt, Egle; Liefgreen, Alice; Próchnicki, Maciej; Rosas, Alejandro; Hannikainen, Ivar R.Despite pervasive variation in the content of laws, legal theorists and anthropologists have arguedthat laws share certain abstract features and even speculated that law may be a human universal. Inthe present report, we evaluate this thesis through an experiment administered in 11 different coun-tries. Are there cross-cultural principles of law? In a between-subjects design, participants (N = 3,054)were asked whether there could be laws that violate certain procedural principles (e.g., laws applied retrospectively or unintelligible laws), and also whether there are any such laws. Confirming our pre-registered prediction, people reported that such laws cannot exist, but also (paradoxically) that there aresuch laws. These results document cross-culturally and –linguistically robust beliefs about the conceptof law which defy people’s grasp of how legal systems function in practice.Capítulo de Livro The Experimental Jurisprudence of the Concept of Rule: Implications for the Hart-Fuller Debate(2023) GUILHERME DA FRANCA COUTO FERNANDES DE ALMEIDA; Struchiner, Noel; Hannikainen, Ivar R.Capítulo de Livro What Do We Mean by Precedent? Empirical Evidence of Ordinary Usage(2022) Andrade, Priscila C. de; GUILHERME DA FRANCA COUTO FERNANDES DE ALMEIDA; Hannikainen, Ivar R.; Struchiner, NoelLegal theorists disagree about the nature of precedent. In a purely descriptive sense, what does it mean to say that a particular case sets a precedent? Does it (a) establish a rule that is deductively applied to subsequent cases (the deductive view), or (b) trace a relevant dimension of factual resemblance between the source case and subsequent cases by analogy (the analogical view)? To answer these questions, we conducted a series of three studies on the matter. In Study 1, we documented people’s tendency to adopt the analogical interpretation over the deductive one. Theorists have also debated whether, normatively, judges ought to apply precedents deductively or analogically—with some arguing that the analogical view affords excessive discretionary power. Yet, the results of Studies 2 and 3 undermine this claim: While participants did indeed infer more specific rules than analogical features (Study 2), the generality of analogical interpretation was not driven by the opportunity to treat prior cases as precedents (Study 3). These findings suggest that the analogical view is prevalent among the folk, while undermining some of the normative arguments against it.Artigo Científico Apply the Laws, if They are Good: Moral Evaluations Linearly Predict Whether Judges Should Enforce the Law(2024) Engelmann, Neele; GUILHERME DA FRANCA COUTO FERNANDES DE ALMEIDA; Sousa, Felipe Oliveira de; Prochownik, Karolina; Hannikainen, Ivar R.; Struchiner, Noel; Magen, StefanWhat should judges do when faced with immoral laws? Should they apply them without exception, since “the law is the law?” Or can exceptions be made for grossly immoral laws, such as historically, Nazi law? Surveying laypeople (N = 167) and people with some legal training (N = 141) on these matters, we find a surprisingly strong, monotonic relationship between people’s subjective moral evaluation of laws and their judgments that these laws should be applied in concrete cases. This tendency is most pronounced among individuals who endorse natural law (i.e., the legal-philosophical view that immoral laws are not valid laws at all), and is attenuated when disagreement about the moral status of a law is considered reasonable. The relationship is equally strong for laypeople and for those with legal training. We situate our findings within the broader context of morality’s influence on legal reasoning that experimental jurisprudence has uncovered in recent years, and consider normative implications.