BRUNO VARELLA MIRANDA

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  • Imagem de Miniatura
    Opening the “black box” of food safety policy implementation: the efficiency-enhancing role of a private meso-institution
    (2023) Oliveira, Gustavo Magalhães de; BRUNO VARELLA MIRANDA; Saes, Maria Sylvia Macchione; Martino, Gaetano
    There is continuing interest in how rules created at the “institutional environment” level influence the perfor mance of food safety policies. The influence of institutional rules on the behavior of farms and firms may vary widely depending on how strongly incentives reach potential users. This article assesses how the creation of a private meso-institution (i.e., Conseleite) affects the implementation of food safety guidelines in the Brazilian dairy industry. We use a dataset that has laboratory analyses of milk from 18 out of the 27 Brazilian states over a period that goes from 2006 to 2014. We show that the creation of Conseleite has led to an increased effectiveness of implementation of the Normative Instruction 51, which sets indicators and basic parameters of milk quality in Brazil. Specifically, the creation of Conseleite in the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso do Sul led to a decrease in the low-quality index related to the bacterial contamination of milk. In turn, we find that Conseleite played a limited role in raising the values of the high-quality milk index. Our conclusions highlight the fundamental role of meso institutions in bridging the gap between the “institutional environment” level and the “governance” level. This study sheds light on a potential policy implementation path for other developing and emerging countries in the dairy industry, which is marked by frequent food safety scandals.
  • Imagem de Miniatura
    Assessing the performance of voluntary environmental agreements under high monitoring costs: Evidence from the Brazilian Amazon
    (2023) BRUNO VARELLA MIRANDA; Oliveira, Gustavo Magalhães de
    Voluntary environmental arrangements generally coexist with State-based and private rules, creating a property rights system that legitimizes certain behaviors. In a world of positive transaction costs, legitimacy ensues from imperfect monitoring activities, opening room for opportunism. In this paper, we discuss how the existence of multiple rules in a scenario of high monitoring costs affects the performance of an environmental policy. We discuss the case of deferred prosecution agreements (TAC, acronym in Portuguese), which are voluntary arrangements designed with the goal of incentivizing slaughterhouses to monitor the environmental practices of ranchers in the Brazilian Amazon. More specifically, we study how the signature of a TAC agreement affects deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazônia Legal region at the municipality level. This paper adopts a difference-in-differences approach to analyze a sample of Brazilian municipalities between 2006 and 2017. Our results, which remain robust across alternative estimators and subsamples, show that the signature of a TAC agreement increases deforestation rates by 0.2 standard deviations. We argue that the signature of a TAC agreement, by creating an imperfect proxy for “good behavior” that enables both compliant and non-compliant organizations to access credit, may incentivize deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon.