Navegando por Autor "Struchiner, Noel"
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Artigo Científico Apply the Laws, if They are Good: Moral Evaluations Linearly Predict Whether Judges Should Enforce the Law(2024) Engelmann, Neele; GUILHERME DA FRANCA COUTO FERNANDES DE ALMEIDA; Sousa, Felipe Oliveira de; Prochownik, Karolina; Hannikainen, Ivar R.; Struchiner, Noel; Magen, StefanWhat should judges do when faced with immoral laws? Should they apply them without exception, since “the law is the law?” Or can exceptions be made for grossly immoral laws, such as historically, Nazi law? Surveying laypeople (N = 167) and people with some legal training (N = 141) on these matters, we find a surprisingly strong, monotonic relationship between people’s subjective moral evaluation of laws and their judgments that these laws should be applied in concrete cases. This tendency is most pronounced among individuals who endorse natural law (i.e., the legal-philosophical view that immoral laws are not valid laws at all), and is attenuated when disagreement about the moral status of a law is considered reasonable. The relationship is equally strong for laypeople and for those with legal training. We situate our findings within the broader context of morality’s influence on legal reasoning that experimental jurisprudence has uncovered in recent years, and consider normative implications.Artigo Científico Coordination and expertise foster legal textualism(2022) Hannikainen, Ivar R.; Tobia, Kevin P.; Almeida, Guilherme da F. C. F. de; Struchiner, Noel; Kneer, Markus; Bystranowski, Piotr; Dranseika, Vilius; Strohmaier, Niek; Bensinger, Samantha; Dolinina, Kristina; Janik, Bartosz; Lauraityte, Egle; Laakasuo, Michael; Liefgreen, Alice; Neiders, Ivars; Próchnicki, Maciej; Rosas, Alejandro; Sundvall, Jukka; Żuradzki, TomaszA cross-cultural survey experiment revealed a dominant tendency to rely on a rule’s letter over its spirit when deciding which behaviors violate the rule. This tendency varied markedly across (k = 15) countries, owing to variation in the impact of moral appraisals on judgments of rule violation. Compared with laypeople, legal experts were more inclined to disregard their moral evaluations of the acts altogether and consequently exhibited stronger textualist tendencies. Finally, we evaluated a plausible mechanism for the emergence of textualism: in a two-player coordination game, incentives to coordinate in the absence of communication reinforced participants’ adherence to rules’ literal meaning. Together, these studies (total n = 5,794) help clarify the origins and allure of textualism, especially in the law. Within heterogeneous communities in which members diverge in their moral appraisals involving a rule’s purpose, the rule’s literal meaning provides a clear focal point—an identifiable point of agreement enabling coordinated interpretation among citizens, lawmakers, and judges.Artigo Científico Do Formalist Judges Abide By Their Abstract Principles? A Two-Country Study in Adjudication(2021) Bystranowski, Piotr; Janik, Bartosz; Próchnicki, Maciej; Hannikainen, Ivar Rodriguez; GUILHERME DA FRANCA COUTO FERNANDES DE ALMEIDA; Struchiner, NoelRecent literature in experimental philosophy has postulated the existence of the abstract/concrete paradox (ACP): the tendency to activate inconsistent intuitions (and generate inconsistent judgment) depending on whether a problem to be analyzed is framed in abstract terms or is described as a concrete case. One recent study supports the thesis that this effect influences judicial decision-making, including decision-making by professional judges, in areas such as interpretation of constitutional principles and application of clear-cut rules. Here, following the existing literature in legal theory, we argue that the susceptibility to such an effect might depend on whether decision-makers operate in a legal system characterized by the formalist or particularist approach to legal interpretation, with formalist systems being less susceptible to the effect. To test this hypothesis, we compare the results of experimental studies on ACP run on samples from two countries differing in legal culture: Poland and Brazil. The lack of significant differences between those results (also for professional legal decision-makers) suggests that ACP is a robust effect in the legal context.- Law, coercion, and folk intuitions(2023) Miotto, Lucas; Almeida, Guilherme F. C. F.; Struchiner, NoelIn discussing whether legal systems are necessarily coercive, legal philosophers usually appeal to thought experiments involving angels or other morally driven beings who need no coercion to organise their social lives. Such appeals have invited criticism. Critics have not only challenged the relevance of such thought experiments to our understanding of legal systems; they have also argued that, contrary to the intuitions of most legal philosophers, the ‘man on the Clapham Omnibus’ would not hold that there is law in a society of angels because the view that law is necessarily coercive ‘enjoys widespread support among laypersons’. This is obviously an empirical claim. Critics, however, never systematically polled the ‘man on the Clapham Omnibus’. We boarded that bus. This article discusses findings from five empirical studies on the relationship between law and coercion.
- Moral appraisals guide intuitive legal determinations(2023) Flanagan, Brian; Almeida, Guilherme F. C. F. de; Struchiner, Noel; Hannikainen, Ivar R.We sought to understand how basic competencies in moral reasoning influence the application of private, institutional, and legal rules. Hypotheses: We predicted that moral appraisals, implicating both outcome-based and mental state reasoning, would shape participants’ interpretation of rules and statutes—and asked whether these effects arise differentially under intuitive and reflective reasoning conditions. Method: In six vignette-based experiments (total N = 2,473; 293 university law students [67% women; age bracket mode: 18–22 years] and 2,180 online workers [60% women; mean age = 31.9 years]), participants considered a wide range of written rules and laws and determined whether a protagonist had violated the rule in question. We manipulated morally relevant aspects of each incident—including the valence of the rule’s purpose (Study 1) and of the outcomes that ensued (Studies 2 and 3), as well as the protagonist’s accompanying mental state (Studies 5 and 6). In two studies, we simultaneously varied whether participants decided under time pressure or following a forced delay (Studies 4 and 6). Results: Moral appraisals of the rule’s purpose, the agent’s extraneous blameworthiness, and the agent’s epistemic state impacted legal determinations and helped to explain participants’ departure from rules’ literal interpretation. Counter-literal verdicts were stronger under time pressure and were weakened by the opportunity to reflect. Conclusions: Under intuitive reasoning conditions, legal determinations draw on core competencies in moral cognition, such as outcome-based and mental state reasoning. In turn, cognitive reflection dampens these effects on statutory interpretation, allowing text to play a more influential role.
- Purposes in Law and in Life: an experimental investigation of purpose attribution(2023) Almeida, Guilherme da Franca Couto Fernandes de; Knobe, Joshua; Struchiner, Noel; Hannikainen, Ivar R.There has been considerable debate in legal philosophy about how to attribute purposes to rules. Separately, within cognitive science, there has been a growing body of research concerned with questions about how people ordinarily attribute purposes. Here, we argue that these two separate fields might be connected by experimental jurisprudence. Across four studies, we find evidence for the claim that people use the same criteria to attribute purposes to physical objects and to rules. In both cases, purpose attributions appear to be governed not so much by original intention or by moral value as by current practice. We argue that these findings in the cognitive science of purpose attribution have implications for jurisprudential questions involving purposivist legal interpretation.
- Rule is a dual character concept(2023) Almeida, Guilherme da Franca Couto Fernandes de; Struchiner, Noel; Hannikainen, Ivar RodriguezRecent experimental work revealed that rule violation judgments are sensitive to morality. For instance: when someone blamelessly violates a rule's text, about half of the participants say that the rule was violated, with the remainder saying that it wasn't. Why is that so? Current evidence is compatible with three distinct explanations. According to the pragmatic view, rule violation judgments pragmatically imply judgments of blame. Hence, the results don't tell us anything about the concept of rule itself. Instead, they are simply caused by conversational pragmatics. On the other hand, the mixed character view states that the concept of rule simultaneously combines text and purpose into a single criterion. Finally, the dual character view states that the concept of rule is similar to the concepts of scientist and father. These concepts have two distinct sets of criteria, each sufficient to determine one sense in which the concept applies. One of the criteria is descriptive, while the other is normative. In this paper, we report the results of four studies designed to adjudicate between these alternatives. Studies 1A and 1B find results that are incompatible with the pragmatic view, while Study 2 shows that the concept of rule behaves in a way that is notably different than some mixed character concepts on a linguistic test. Finally, Studies 3–5 support the idea that the concept of rule has a dual character. We consider the jurisprudential implications of each alternative.
Capítulo de Livro The Experimental Jurisprudence of the Concept of Rule: Implications for the Hart-Fuller Debate(2023) GUILHERME DA FRANCA COUTO FERNANDES DE ALMEIDA; Struchiner, Noel; Hannikainen, Ivar R.Capítulo de Livro What Do We Mean by Precedent? Empirical Evidence of Ordinary Usage(2022) Andrade, Priscila C. de; GUILHERME DA FRANCA COUTO FERNANDES DE ALMEIDA; Hannikainen, Ivar R.; Struchiner, NoelLegal theorists disagree about the nature of precedent. In a purely descriptive sense, what does it mean to say that a particular case sets a precedent? Does it (a) establish a rule that is deductively applied to subsequent cases (the deductive view), or (b) trace a relevant dimension of factual resemblance between the source case and subsequent cases by analogy (the analogical view)? To answer these questions, we conducted a series of three studies on the matter. In Study 1, we documented people’s tendency to adopt the analogical interpretation over the deductive one. Theorists have also debated whether, normatively, judges ought to apply precedents deductively or analogically—with some arguing that the analogical view affords excessive discretionary power. Yet, the results of Studies 2 and 3 undermine this claim: While participants did indeed infer more specific rules than analogical features (Study 2), the generality of analogical interpretation was not driven by the opportunity to treat prior cases as precedents (Study 3). These findings suggest that the analogical view is prevalent among the folk, while undermining some of the normative arguments against it.