JOSÉ HELENO FARO
Lattes
ORCID
ScopusProjetos de Pesquisa
Unidades Organizacionais
Resumo profissional
Área de pesquisa
Nome para créditos
6 resultados
Resultados de Busca
Agora exibindo 1 - 6 de 6
Artigo Científico Alpha-maxmin as an aggregation of two selve(2024) Chateauneuf, Alain; JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Tallon, Jean-Marc; Vergopoulos, VassiliThis paper offers a novel perspective on the -maxmin model, taking its components as originating from distinct selves within the decision maker. Drawing from the notion of multiple selves prevalent in inter-temporal decision-making contexts, we present an aggregation approach where each self possesses its own preference relation. Contrary to existing interpretations, these selves are not merely a means to interpret the decision maker’s overall utility function but are considered as primitives. Through consistency requirements, we derive an -maxmin representation as an outcome of a convex combination of the preferences of two distinct selves. We first explore a setting involving objective information and then move on to a fully subjective derivation.Artigo Científico Independence and variational bewley preferences: a note(2020) Bastianello, Lorenzo; JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Teles, FláviaThis note studies some alternatives and weak versions of the Independence axiom in a decision theoretic framework under uncertainty. We propose a characterization of this axiom using a property called Weight Independence. Moreover we study how the Independence axiom is related with the Variational Bewley model of Faro [2015]. We show that Variational Bewley preferences satisfy a weaker form of independence called Independence for Constant Weights. This topic gives us the opportunity to discuss the pioneeristic contributions of David Schmeidler on the weakening of the Independence axiom.Artigo Científico Dynamically consistent objective and subjective rationality(2022) Bastianello, Lorenzo; JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Santos, AnaA group of experts, for instance climate scientists, is to advise a decision maker about the choice between two policies f and g. Consider the following decision rule. If all experts agree that the expected utility of f is higher than the expected utility of g, the unanimity rule applies, and f is chosen. Otherwise, the precautionary principle is implemented and the policy yielding the highest minimal expected utility is chosen. This decision rule may lead to time inconsistencies when adding an intermediate period of partial resolution of uncertainty. We show how to coherently reassess the initial set of experts’ beliefs so that precautionary choices become dynamically consistent: new beliefs should be added until one obtains the smallest “rectangular set” that contains the original one. Our analysis offers a novel behavioral characterization of rectangularity and a prescriptive way to aggregate opinions in order to avoid sure regret.Artigo Científico Updating variational (Bewley) preferences(2021) JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Santos, AnaArtigo Científico Dynamically consistent objective and subjective rationality(2022) JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Bastianello, Lorenzo; Santos, AnaArtigo Científico Choquet expected discounted utility(2022) JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Bastianello, Lorenzo