JOSÉ HELENO FARO
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Trabalho de Evento Dynamic bbjective and subjective rationality(2014) JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Lefort, Jean PhilippeThe objective and subjective rationality model characterizes decision makers (DMs) by two preference relations over uncertain acts and provides a dual perspective on rationality. The Örst preference reáects choices that are rational in an objective sense and the second one expresses choices labeled as subjectively rational. While an objective ranking means that the DM can convince others of the correctness of making them, in a sub jective choice the DM cannot be convinced of the incorrectness of making them. Objective and subjective preferences are represented, respectively, by Bewleyís unanimity rule and a maxmin expected utility, both repre sentations holding the same set of multiple priors. We propose and axiomatize a dynamic model for the objective and subjective rationality theory. The static model speciÖes some set of prior probabilities, which should be then updated in the light of new and rele vant information. We provide two new axioms on the interplay of uncon ditional objective relations and conditional subjective preferences. Such axioms ensure that a conditional subjective relation is also a maxmin ex pected utility preference and the corresponding set of priors is generated by the full Bayesian updating rule. Our main result thus provides a foun dation for sequentially consistent maxmin subjective preferences, where the prior sets are updated according to the prior-by-prior Bayesí rule. Finally, we study the dynamics of objective preferences and its relations with our main result.Trabalho de Evento Bewley meet Gilboa and Schmeidler: legitimate preferences under uncertainty(2014) JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Ok, Efe; Riella, GilWe model an organization by a preference relation over uncertain acts satisfying a set of axioms capturing a legitimate decision making process. We show that our set of behavioral conditions is equivalent to a legitimate representation of preferences: there exist two nested sets of priors in which the smaller one represents the set of priors from individuals who occupy higher positions within the organization, while the larger one takes into account also probabilistic beliefs from people of lower positions. A legitimate decision that supports an act f against an act g includes authorization, which occurs when the smaller set of priors unanimously deems the act f better than the act g, a la Bewley (2002), and endorsement, which occurs when the larger set of priors deems the act f better than the act g according to a maxmin rule a la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).Trabalho de Evento Caution valuation rules and rfficiency in financial markets(2014) JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Chateauneuf, Alain; Araujo, Aloisio