FABIO ADRIANO MIESSI SANCHES
Unidades Organizacionais
Resumo profissional
person.page.researcharea
Nome para créditos
8 resultados
Resultados da Pesquisa
Agora exibindo 1 - 8 de 8
Dissertação Efeitos da guerra fiscal na competição locacional pela indústria na região de influência de São Paulo.(2021) Asquino, Marcelo SacencoEssa pesquisa busca observar se incentivos tributários estão produzindo efeitos na localização industrial na região de influência de São Paulo. Tomamos o Valor Adicionado Fiscal como proxy para a distribuição da atividade entre os municípios, considerando os municípios dos estados de São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Espírito Santo, Goiás, Mato Grosso do Sul, Paraná e Santa Catarina como o mercado regional influenciado por São Paulo, para a decisão de localização que observa custos logísticos rodoviários e carga tributária como fator preço da atratividade locacional. Observamos efeitos positivos no grupo de municípios sujeito a tratamento,especialmente naqueles situados em eixos rodoviários de alta capacidade e próximos à fronteira do estado de São Paulo. Análises contrafactuais realizadas a partir de um modelo de equilíbrio demonstram que esses efeitos poderiam ser minimizados, se incentivos fossem reduzidos ou extintos. Nossa pesquisa pretende contribuir para a discussão da distribuição da atividade no território incentivada por políticas públicas que possam vir a acentuar a assimetria na distribuição do desenvolvimento socioeconômico e seus efeitos no bem-estar social, prejudicando a busca por redução de desigualdades regionais, preconizada na Constituição de 1988Artigo Científico How to attract physicians to underserved areas? Policy recommendations from a structural model(2023) Costa, Francisco; Nunes, Letícia; FABIO ADRIANO MIESSI SANCHESThis paper exploits location choices of all generalist physicians who graduated in Brazil between 2001 and 2013 to study policies aimed at increasing the supply of physicians in underserved areas. We set up and estimate a supply and demand model for physicians. We estimate physicians' locational preferences using a random coefficients discrete choice model. The demand has private establishments competing for physicians with private and public facilities around the country. Policy counterfactuals indicate that quotas in medical schools for students born in underserved areas and the opening of vacancies in medical schools in deprived areas are more cost-effective than financial incentives.Artigo Científico How to attract physicians to underserved areas? policy recommendations from a structural model(2022) Costa, Francisco; LETICIA FARIA DE CARVALHO NUNES; FABIO ADRIANO MIESSI SANCHESArtigo Científico Ordinary least squares estimation of a dynamic game model(2016) FABIO ADRIANO MIESSI SANCHES; Silva, Daniel Junior; Srisuma, SorawootArtigo Científico Minimum distance estimation of search costs using price distribution(2018) FABIO ADRIANO MIESSI SANCHES; Silva Junior, Daniel; Srisuma, SorawootArtigo Científico Joint analysis of the discount factor and payoff parameters in dynamic discrete choice models(2018) Komarova, Tatiana; FABIO ADRIANO MIESSI SANCHES; Silva Junior, Daniel; Srisuma, SorawootArtigo Científico Banking privatization and market structure in Brazil: a dynamic structural analysis(2018) FABIO ADRIANO MIESSI SANCHES; Silva Junior, Daniel; Srisuma, SorawootTese Optimal Subsidies in Capacity-Constrained Essential Services(2025) Botelho, Vinícius de OliveiraThe public provision in mixed markets for essential services, like education, health, and childcare, is typically subsidized to increase take-up despite being often capacity-constrained. However, subsidizing a capacity-constrained option does not increase access unless subsidies reduce private prices or the crowding out of the private alternatives (through consumer sorting). If these equilibrium effects are absent, maximizing access may require reallocating resources currently used to subsidize the public option toward other strategies, such as expanding public firm capacity or subsidizing private supply. This paper focuses on the optimal combination of subsidies between private and public firms, keeping capacity fixed. We estimate a structural supply and demand model for the Brazilian higher education market, where private firms compete with a high-quality, free, and capacity-constrained public provision. We show that subsidizing the public option when it is capacity-constrained increases the crowding out of private schools but reduces private prices. The private price reduction could make the subsidies to capacityconstrained providers increase access; nevertheless, we show that implementing a reform that slightly increases the monthly tuition for public degrees and provides a budget-neutral unconditional scholarship reduces excess demand in public schools and increases enrollment, consumer surplus, and profits.

Lattes
Scopus