Vote Splitting, Reelection and Electoral Control: Political Gridlocks, Ideology and the War on Terror

dc.contributor.authorBugarin, Mauricio Soares
dc.coverage.cidadeSão Paulopt_BR
dc.coverage.paisBrasilpt_BR
dc.creatorBugarin, Mauricio Soares
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-17T14:38:47Z
dc.date.available2023-07-17T14:38:47Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.description.otherThis article presents a game-theoretic model of voting and political bargaining where voters have two instruments for controlling politicians: vote splitting and reelection. It shows that vote splitting may totally offset the traditional reelection control mechanism, which suggests an application to the American 2004 Presidential elections. When reelection is useful, voters tend to have more flexible reelection criteria when they believe the true state of the world is likely to be unfavorable. Furthermore, there will be government shutdown with positive probability. Political gridlocks constitute an information revelation mechanism that improves subsequent control. The model is robust to voters’ ideological heterogeneity.pt_BR
dc.format.extent30 p.pt_BR
dc.format.mediumDigitalpt_BR
dc.identifier.issueWPE 199/2009
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/5804
dc.language.isoInglêspt_BR
dc.publisherInsperpt_BR
dc.publisherIBMEC São Paulopt_BR
dc.relation.ispartofseriesInsper Working Paperpt_BR
dc.rights.licenseO INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DO USUÁRIO VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITORpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsElectoral controlpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsreelectionpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsvote splittingpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsgovernment shutdownpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsideologypt_BR
dc.titleVote Splitting, Reelection and Electoral Control: Political Gridlocks, Ideology and the War on Terrorpt_BR
dc.typeworking paper
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.subject.cnpqCiências Sociais Aplicadaspt_BR
local.typeWorking Paperpt_BR
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