Judicial Review of Antitrust Decisions: incentives for settlements?

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dc.contributor.authorPAULO FURQUIM DE AZEVEDO
dc.coverage.cidadeSão Paulopt_BR
dc.coverage.paisBrasilpt_BR
dc.date.accessioned2022-08-22T20:52:04Z
dc.date.available2022-08-22T20:52:04Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.description.notesTexto completo. Indicação de data de acordo com controle interno.pt_BR
dc.description.otherJudicial review is an essential part of competition policy institutions. In countries where the competition agency is an administrative body, judicial review may improve, mitigate or completely modify the administrative decision, and is, as a consequence, ultimately responsible for the enforcement of competition law. This article highlights an additional effect of judicial review: the incentives to induce settlements between competition authorities and companies, both in merger or conduct cases. I argue that the perspective of long and costly adversarial procedures associated to trials induce parts to negotiate and reach an agreement. I provide quantitative and qualitative evidence that Cade, the Brazilian competition authority, reacted strategically to the judicial review of its decisions, both by strengthening rules of due process and by fostering settlements with merged companies or defendants. The overall effect of judicial review on the efficacy of competition policy is ambiguous. The awareness towards due process and transparency improve decision quality, and settlements reduce litigation costs. However there is also evidence of a crowding-out effect, i.e. dynamically courts mainly tend to review cases in which parties seek to postpone the administrative decision whereas settlements attracts companies that value finality. This adverse selection of litigants distorts the role of the judicial review, as legitimate demanders of judicial services avoid the judiciary and bad litigators overload itpt_BR
dc.format.mediumDigitalpt_BR
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4074
dc.language.isoInglêspt_BR
dc.rights.licenseO INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DOS USUÁRIOS INDIVIDUAIS VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITORpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsJudicial reviewpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordscompetition policypt_BR
dc.subject.keywordssettlementspt_BR
dc.titleJudicial Review of Antitrust Decisions: incentives for settlements?pt_BR
dc.typeworking paper
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.subject.cnpqCiências Sociais Aplicadaspt_BR
local.typeWorking Paperpt_BR
relation.isAuthorOfPublication25ce9242-4c33-4eb0-8fd6-db1b8dc52452
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery25ce9242-4c33-4eb0-8fd6-db1b8dc52452

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