Coleção Insper Business and Economics Working Papers
URI permanente para esta coleçãohttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/5740
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Resultados da Pesquisa
Working Paper Strategizing by the Government: Industrial Policy and Sustainable Competitive Advantage(2012) SERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINIDespite the prevalence of active governmental policy devised to foster firms and industries in various countries, the link between industrial policy (IP) and competitive advantage has received scant attention in Strategic Management. I propose a model where IP influences the accumulation and churning of resources and capabilities which can be flexible or specialized. I also introduce the concept of support-adjusted sustainable competitive advantage (SASCA), which occurs if a firm’s observed economic performance is superior to the expected performance of competitors had they received the same array of policies. In my framework, SASCA is created by the interplay of three factors: external integration, geographical specificity, and policy-making capability. Thus, the model enhances our understanding of the determinants of competitive advantage in a context of governmental intervention.Working Paper Leviathan as a Minority Shareholder: Firm-Level Implications of Equity Purchases by the State(2012) Inoue, Carlos F. K. V.; SERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINI; Musacchio, AldoIn many countries, firms face institutional voids that raise the costs of doing business and thwart entrepreneurial activity. We examine a particular mechanism to address those voids: minority state ownership. Due to their minority nature, such stakes are less affected by the agency distortions commonly found in full-fledged state-owned firms. Using panel data from publicly traded firms in Brazil, where the government holds minority stakes through its development bank (BNDES), we find a positive effect of those stakes on firms’ return on assets and on the capital expenditures of financially constrained firms with investment opportunities. However, these positive effects are substantially reduced when minority stakes are allocated to business group affiliates and as local institutions develop. Therefore, we shed light on the firm-level implications of minority state ownership, a topic that has received scant attention in the strategy literature.Working Paper Private Entrepreneurs In Public Services: A Longitudinal Examination Of Outsourcing and Statization Of Prisons(2011) SANDRO CABRAL; SERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINI; PAULO FURQUIM DE AZEVEDOSome fear that the profit-maximizing orientation of private entrepreneurs conflicts with societal goals expected in the provision of complex public services. Received contractual theories advocate that private involvement in public services will result in cost reductions at the expense of quality. Using prisons as our empirical context, we benefit from an event involving the outsourcing and subsequent statization of correctional facilities in Brazil. Triangulating between quantitative and qualitative information, we do not find evidence of quality deterioration in outsourced prisons and suggest that a key mechanism driving this result is the presence of public supervisors closely working on site with private entrepreneurs in a hybrid governance fashion. We then deliver a set of new propositions that move beyond hazard considerations to examine how the combination of heterogeneous public and private capabilities might yield learning and spillover effects unattainable through pure government management or full-fledged privatization.Working Paper Leviathan as a Minority Shareholder: A Study of Equity Purchases by the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES), 1995-2003(2010) SERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINI; Musacchio, AldoWorking Paper Guarding the Guardians: An Analysis of Investigations against Police(2010) SANDRO CABRAL; SERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINIInternal affairs divisions are organizations crafted to monitor the behavior of police officers. However, like many other public bureaucracies, the police is plagued with the “who guards the guardians” dilemma, which is a typical organizational design problem that occurs when the agents to be monitored are appointed as monitors. Consequently, there are reasons to believe that investigations will be inherently biased towards of certain police officers and certain types of deviations. In this paper we examine reasons why some complaints against police officers are sustained or not and if these complaints foster or not consequential sanctions. We employ a distinct dataset containing detailed information on investigation processes against police officers performed by the internal affairs division of a police organization in Brazil. We find that while certain organizational procedures adopted by the internal affairs division increase the speed in which the investigation is concluded, certain officer-specific characteristics (such as the status and tenure of the officer) and the nature of the accusation significantly affect the final verdict, thus suggesting potential bias in the overall process.Working Paper Meritocracy and Innovation: Is There a Link? Empirical Evidence from Firms in Brazil(2009) Barros, Henrique Machado; SERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINIWe investigate whether meritocracy affects firms’ innovation performance. More specifically, we empirically evaluate the prediction that the use of higher performance-based pay and promotion should lead to a higher percentage of firm revenues coming from innovations in products and services. To test this prediction, we employ a survey of 370 Brazilian firms in a broad range of industries. Our two-stage regressions, devised to account for potential endogeneity, indicate that while the use of performance-based promotion strongly affects innovation, the effect of contingent pay is marginal. Apparently, the long-term feature of promotion-based meritocracy is more effective to tap into individuals’ creativity than is short-term pay. Our study sheds light on the debate about how organizational practices can affect the innovative potential of firms.Working Paper Self-interest and organizational performance: an empirical examination with U.S. and Brazilian managers(2008) SERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINI; Islam, Gazi; Mesquita, Luiz Ferraz de