Artigos em Andamento [Working Paper]
URI permanente desta comunidadehttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/3232
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Working Paper Ignorance and Competence in Choices Under Uncertainty(2013) Casaca, Paulo; Chateauneuf, Alain; JOSÉ HELENO FAROWorking Paper Dynamic Objective and Subjective Rationality(2013) JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Lefortz, Jean PhilippeThe objective and subjective rationality model characterizes decision makers (DMs) by two preference relations over uncertainty acts and provides a dual perspective of rationality. The Örst preference reáects choices that are rational in an objective sense and the second ones express choices labeled subjective rational. While an objective ranking means that the DM can convince others that she is right in making them, in a subjective choice the DM cannot be convinced that she is wrong in making them. Objective and subjective preferences are represented, respectively, by a Bewleyís unanimity rule and a maxmin expected utility, both representations holding the same set of multiple priors. We propose and axiomatize a dynamic Bayesian model for the objective and subjective rationality theory. The static model specifies some set of prior probabilities, which should be then updated in the light of new and relevant information. We provide two new axioms on the interplay of unconditional objective relations and conditional subjective preferences. Such axioms ensure that a conditional subjective relation is also a maxmin expected utility preference and the corresponding set of priors is derived from the full Bayesian updating, i.e., it is generated by the prior-by-prior updating of all unconditional probabilities. Our main result thus provides a novel foundation for sequential consistent maxmin preferences as well as for the full Bayesian updating. Finally, we study the dynamics of objective preferences and its relations with our main result.Working Paper Cobb-Douglas Preferences under Uncertainty(2012) JOSÉ HELENO FAROThis paper axiomatizes Cobb-Douglas preferences under uncertainty. First, we extend the original Trockel (1989)'s axiomatic foundation to a general state space framework based on the Strong Homotheticity Axiom, obtaining also the incomplete case a la Bewley (2002). We show that this key axiom for the Cobb Douglas expected utility speci cation is refuted by Ellsberg's uncertainty aver sion behavioral pattern. Our main result provides a set of meaningful axioms characterizing Cobb-Douglas Min-Expected Utility preferences, an important class of uncertainty averse preferences for studying the consequences of am biguity in nance and other elds. Finally, we present brie y how to obtain more general representations like the variational case.Working Paper Variational Bewley Preferences(2014) JOSÉ HELENO FAROWorking Paper Efficient Complete Markets Are the Rule Rather thanthe Exception(2015) JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Chateauneuf, Alain; Araujo, Aloisio