Artigos Acadêmicos e Noticiosos
URI permanente desta comunidadehttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/3226
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Artigo Científico Apply the Laws, if They are Good: Moral Evaluations Linearly Predict Whether Judges Should Enforce the Law(2024) Engelmann, Neele; GUILHERME DA FRANCA COUTO FERNANDES DE ALMEIDA; Sousa, Felipe Oliveira de; Prochownik, Karolina; Hannikainen, Ivar R.; Struchiner, Noel; Magen, StefanWhat should judges do when faced with immoral laws? Should they apply them without exception, since “the law is the law?” Or can exceptions be made for grossly immoral laws, such as historically, Nazi law? Surveying laypeople (N = 167) and people with some legal training (N = 141) on these matters, we find a surprisingly strong, monotonic relationship between people’s subjective moral evaluation of laws and their judgments that these laws should be applied in concrete cases. This tendency is most pronounced among individuals who endorse natural law (i.e., the legal-philosophical view that immoral laws are not valid laws at all), and is attenuated when disagreement about the moral status of a law is considered reasonable. The relationship is equally strong for laypeople and for those with legal training. We situate our findings within the broader context of morality’s influence on legal reasoning that experimental jurisprudence has uncovered in recent years, and consider normative implications.Artigo Científico A dual character theory of law(2024) GUILHERME DA FRANCA COUTO FERNANDES DE ALMEIDAOne persistent question in jurisprudence relates to the role of morality in the concept of law. For instance, consider the question of whether unjust statutes are laws. Legal positivists say that they’re laws in every relevant sense, while natural lawyers say that they’re not. This article considers a different answer inspired by recent findings in experimental philosophy: there is one relevant sense in which unjust statutes are laws, but also a different relevant sense in which they aren’t. After considering the ways in which this alternative differs from some of the mainstream theories in general jurisprudence, the article argues that it provides more elegant solutions to two problems that have puzzled legal philosophers in the past: the paradox of customary international law and the shifts in legal discourse over history.Artigo Científico Exploring the psychology of LLMs’ moral and legal reasoning(2024) GUILHERME DA FRANCA COUTO FERNANDES DE ALMEIDA; Nunes, José Luiz; Engelmann, Neele; Wiegmann, Alex; Araújo, Marcelo deLarge language models (LLMs) exhibit expert-level performance in tasks across a wide range of different domains. Ethical issues raised by LLMs and the need to align future versions makes it important to know how state of the art models reason about moral and legal issues. In this paper, we employ the methods of experimental psychology to probe into this question. We replicate eight studies from the experimental literature with instances of Google's Gemini Pro, Anthropic's Claude 2.1, OpenAI's GPT-4, and Meta's Llama 2 Chat 70b. We find that alignment with human responses shifts from one experiment to another, and that models differ amongst themselves as to their overall alignment, with GPT-4 taking a clear lead over all other models we tested. Nonetheless, even when LLM-generated responses are highly correlated to human responses, there are still systematic differences, with a tendency for models to exaggerate effects that are present among humans, in part by reducing variance. This recommends caution with regards to proposals of replacing human participants with current state-of-the-art LLMs in psychological research and highlights the need for further research about the distinctive aspects of machine psychologyArtigo Científico Do Formalist Judges Abide By Their Abstract Principles? A Two-Country Study in Adjudication(2021) Bystranowski, Piotr; Janik, Bartosz; Próchnicki, Maciej; Hannikainen, Ivar Rodriguez; GUILHERME DA FRANCA COUTO FERNANDES DE ALMEIDA; Struchiner, NoelRecent literature in experimental philosophy has postulated the existence of the abstract/concrete paradox (ACP): the tendency to activate inconsistent intuitions (and generate inconsistent judgment) depending on whether a problem to be analyzed is framed in abstract terms or is described as a concrete case. One recent study supports the thesis that this effect influences judicial decision-making, including decision-making by professional judges, in areas such as interpretation of constitutional principles and application of clear-cut rules. Here, following the existing literature in legal theory, we argue that the susceptibility to such an effect might depend on whether decision-makers operate in a legal system characterized by the formalist or particularist approach to legal interpretation, with formalist systems being less susceptible to the effect. To test this hypothesis, we compare the results of experimental studies on ACP run on samples from two countries differing in legal culture: Poland and Brazil. The lack of significant differences between those results (also for professional legal decision-makers) suggests that ACP is a robust effect in the legal context.Artigo Científico Are There Cross-Cultural Legal Principles? Modal Reasoning Uncovers Procedural Constraints on Law(2021) Tobia, Kevin P.; GUILHERME DA FRANCA COUTO FERNANDES DE ALMEIDA; Donelson, Raff; Dranseika, Vilius; Kneer, Markus; Strohmaier, Niek; Bystranowski, Piotr; Dolinina, Kristina; Janik, Bartosz; Keo, Sothie; Lauraityt, Egle; Liefgreen, Alice; Próchnicki, Maciej; Rosas, Alejandro; Hannikainen, Ivar R.Despite pervasive variation in the content of laws, legal theorists and anthropologists have arguedthat laws share certain abstract features and even speculated that law may be a human universal. Inthe present report, we evaluate this thesis through an experiment administered in 11 different coun-tries. Are there cross-cultural principles of law? In a between-subjects design, participants (N = 3,054)were asked whether there could be laws that violate certain procedural principles (e.g., laws applied retrospectively or unintelligible laws), and also whether there are any such laws. Confirming our pre-registered prediction, people reported that such laws cannot exist, but also (paradoxically) that there aresuch laws. These results document cross-culturally and –linguistically robust beliefs about the conceptof law which defy people’s grasp of how legal systems function in practice.- Purposes in Law and in Life: an experimental investigation of purpose attribution(2023) Almeida, Guilherme da Franca Couto Fernandes de; Knobe, Joshua; Struchiner, Noel; Hannikainen, Ivar R.There has been considerable debate in legal philosophy about how to attribute purposes to rules. Separately, within cognitive science, there has been a growing body of research concerned with questions about how people ordinarily attribute purposes. Here, we argue that these two separate fields might be connected by experimental jurisprudence. Across four studies, we find evidence for the claim that people use the same criteria to attribute purposes to physical objects and to rules. In both cases, purpose attributions appear to be governed not so much by original intention or by moral value as by current practice. We argue that these findings in the cognitive science of purpose attribution have implications for jurisprudential questions involving purposivist legal interpretation.
- Law, coercion, and folk intuitions(2023) Miotto, Lucas; Almeida, Guilherme F. C. F.; Struchiner, NoelIn discussing whether legal systems are necessarily coercive, legal philosophers usually appeal to thought experiments involving angels or other morally driven beings who need no coercion to organise their social lives. Such appeals have invited criticism. Critics have not only challenged the relevance of such thought experiments to our understanding of legal systems; they have also argued that, contrary to the intuitions of most legal philosophers, the ‘man on the Clapham Omnibus’ would not hold that there is law in a society of angels because the view that law is necessarily coercive ‘enjoys widespread support among laypersons’. This is obviously an empirical claim. Critics, however, never systematically polled the ‘man on the Clapham Omnibus’. We boarded that bus. This article discusses findings from five empirical studies on the relationship between law and coercion.
- Rule is a dual character concept(2023) Almeida, Guilherme da Franca Couto Fernandes de; Struchiner, Noel; Hannikainen, Ivar RodriguezRecent experimental work revealed that rule violation judgments are sensitive to morality. For instance: when someone blamelessly violates a rule's text, about half of the participants say that the rule was violated, with the remainder saying that it wasn't. Why is that so? Current evidence is compatible with three distinct explanations. According to the pragmatic view, rule violation judgments pragmatically imply judgments of blame. Hence, the results don't tell us anything about the concept of rule itself. Instead, they are simply caused by conversational pragmatics. On the other hand, the mixed character view states that the concept of rule simultaneously combines text and purpose into a single criterion. Finally, the dual character view states that the concept of rule is similar to the concepts of scientist and father. These concepts have two distinct sets of criteria, each sufficient to determine one sense in which the concept applies. One of the criteria is descriptive, while the other is normative. In this paper, we report the results of four studies designed to adjudicate between these alternatives. Studies 1A and 1B find results that are incompatible with the pragmatic view, while Study 2 shows that the concept of rule behaves in a way that is notably different than some mixed character concepts on a linguistic test. Finally, Studies 3–5 support the idea that the concept of rule has a dual character. We consider the jurisprudential implications of each alternative.