Does it pay to antecipate competitor reactions?

dc.contributor.authorRINALDO ARTES
dc.contributor.authorMoura, Marcelo L.
dc.contributor.authorCaetano, Marco Antônio Leonel
dc.contributor.authorSERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINI
dc.contributor.authorGoldberg, Marcelo B.
dc.contributor.authorSilva, César E.
dc.coverage.paisNão Informadopt_BR
dc.creatorMoura, Marcelo L.
dc.creatorCaetano, Marco Antônio Leonel
dc.creatorGoldberg, Marcelo B.
dc.creatorSilva, César E.
dc.date.accessioned2022-08-19T14:38:44Z
dc.date.available2022-08-19T14:38:44Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.description.abstractAnalyzing and anticipating competitor moves has been central to modern competitive strategy. In contexts involving intense interfirm interaction, the value of a particular strategy depends in large part on how competitors will react to it. Despite many developments, anecdotal evidence indicates that the effective use of techniques to gauge decisions based on competitive considerations has been scant in practice. Our paper intends to fill this void. Using data from the auto insurance industry in Brazil, we compare strategies that do and do not anticipate competitor reactions. Basically we show that it does pay to anticipate those reactions. An optimal strategy will explore both demand elasticities and competitors’ patterns of reaction. We show that such “strategic” policy is expected to outperform a “myopic” approach which ignores competitor reactions. We also develop a methodology to compute demand elasticities, reaction functions and numerically compute optimal reaction strategies.pt_BR
dc.description.notesTexto completopt_BR
dc.description.otherAnalyzing and anticipating competitor moves has been central to modern competitive strategy. In contexts involving intense interfirm interaction, the value of a particular strategy depends in large part on how competitors will react to it. Despite many developments, anecdotal evidence indicates that the effective use of techniques to gauge decisions based on competitive considerations has been scant in practice. Our paper intends to fill this void. Using data from the auto insurance industry in Brazil, we compare strategies that do and do not anticipate competitor reactions. Basically we show that it does pay to anticipate those reactions. An optimal strategy will explore both demand elasticities and competitors’ patterns of reaction. We show that such “strategic” policy is expected to outperform a “myopic” approach which ignores competitor reactions. We also develop an methodology to compute demand elasticities, reaction functions and numerically compute optimal reaction strategies.pt_BR
dc.format.extentp. 192-204pt_BR
dc.format.mediumDigitalpt_BR
dc.identifier.issue1pt_BR
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4049
dc.identifier.volume7pt_BR
dc.language.isoInglêspt_BR
dc.publisherNão localizadopt_BR
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Business & Economicspt_BR
dc.rights.licenseO INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DOS USUÁRIOS INDIVIDUAIS VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITORpt_BR
dc.titleDoes it pay to antecipate competitor reactions?pt_BR
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.identifier.sourceUrihttp://www.ojbe.org/oj/index.php/journals/article/view/35/28
local.subject.cnpqCiências Sociais Aplicadaspt_BR
local.typeArtigo Científicopt_BR
relation.isAuthorOfPublication8b791c94-f3e5-4e04-af26-594195a8f576
relation.isAuthorOfPublication4ee022f9-7466-405d-ae1a-6b1e33f611e8
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery4ee022f9-7466-405d-ae1a-6b1e33f611e8

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