Reputation in continuous-time games

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dc.contributor.authorEDUARDO FAINGOLD
dc.contributor.authorSannikov, Yuliy
dc.coverage.paisNão Informadopt_BR
dc.creatorSannikov, Yuliy
dc.date.accessioned2022-12-10T14:40:44Z
dc.date.available2022-12-10T14:40:44Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.description.notesTexto completopt_BR
dc.description.otherWe study reputation dynamics in continuous-time games in which a large player (e.g., government) faces a population of small players (e.g., households) and the large player's actions are imperfectly observable. The major part of our analysis examines the case in which public signals about the large player's actions are distorted by a Brownian motion and the large player is either a normal type, who plays strategically, or a behavioral type, who is committed to playing a stationary strategy. We obtain a clean characterization of sequential equilibria using ordinary differential equations and identify general conditions for the sequential equilibrium to be unique and Markovian in the small players' posterior belief. We find that a rich equilibrium dynamics arises when the small players assign positive prior probability to the behavioral type. By contrast, when it is common knowledge that the large player is the normal type, every public equilibrium of the continuous-time game is payoff-equivalent to one in which a static Nash equilibrium is played after every history. Finally, we examine variations of the model with Poisson signals and multiple behavioral types.pt_BR
dc.format.extentp. 773-876pt_BR
dc.format.mediumDigitalpt_BR
dc.identifier.issue3pt_BR
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4877
dc.identifier.volume79pt_BR
dc.language.isoInglêspt_BR
dc.publisherThe Econometric Societypt_BR
dc.relation.ispartofEconometricapt_BR
dc.rights.licenseO INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DOS USUÁRIOS INDIVIDUAIS VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITORpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsReputationpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsRepeated gamespt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsIncomplete informationpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsContinuous timept_BR
dc.titleReputation in continuous-time gamespt_BR
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.identifier.sourceUrihttps://www.jstor.org/stable/41237770
local.subject.cnpqCiências Sociais Aplicadaspt_BR
local.typeArtigo Científicopt_BR
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationaa879647-fa0d-40da-b742-5f1c7c879b4e
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryaa879647-fa0d-40da-b742-5f1c7c879b4e

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