Moral appraisals guide intuitive legal determinations
dc.contributor.author | Flanagan, Brian | |
dc.contributor.author | Almeida, Guilherme F. C. F. de | |
dc.contributor.author | Struchiner, Noel | |
dc.contributor.author | Hannikainen, Ivar R. | |
dc.creator | Flanagan, Brian | |
dc.creator | Almeida, Guilherme F. C. F. de | |
dc.creator | Struchiner, Noel | |
dc.creator | Hannikainen, Ivar R. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-05-02T19:08:53Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-05-02T19:08:53Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | |
dc.description.abstract | We sought to understand how basic competencies in moral reasoning influence the application of private, institutional, and legal rules. Hypotheses: We predicted that moral appraisals, implicating both outcome-based and mental state reasoning, would shape participants’ interpretation of rules and statutes—and asked whether these effects arise differentially under intuitive and reflective reasoning conditions. Method: In six vignette-based experiments (total N = 2,473; 293 university law students [67% women; age bracket mode: 18–22 years] and 2,180 online workers [60% women; mean age = 31.9 years]), participants considered a wide range of written rules and laws and determined whether a protagonist had violated the rule in question. We manipulated morally relevant aspects of each incident—including the valence of the rule’s purpose (Study 1) and of the outcomes that ensued (Studies 2 and 3), as well as the protagonist’s accompanying mental state (Studies 5 and 6). In two studies, we simultaneously varied whether participants decided under time pressure or following a forced delay (Studies 4 and 6). Results: Moral appraisals of the rule’s purpose, the agent’s extraneous blameworthiness, and the agent’s epistemic state impacted legal determinations and helped to explain participants’ departure from rules’ literal interpretation. Counter-literal verdicts were stronger under time pressure and were weakened by the opportunity to reflect. Conclusions: Under intuitive reasoning conditions, legal determinations draw on core competencies in moral cognition, such as outcome-based and mental state reasoning. In turn, cognitive reflection dampens these effects on statutory interpretation, allowing text to play a more influential role. | en |
dc.format | Digital | |
dc.format.extent | p. 367–383 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1037/lhb0000527 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0147-7307 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1573-661X | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/6626 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | American Psychological Association | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Law and Human Behavior | |
dc.title | Moral appraisals guide intuitive legal determinations | |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
local.identifier.sourceUri | https://psycnet.apa.org/search/display?id=99fffc97-73cf-34a0-2722-309ff364226c&recordId=1&tab=PA&page=1&display=25&sort=PublicationYearMSSort%20desc,AuthorSort%20asc&sr=1 | |
local.publisher.country | Não Informado | |
local.subject.cnpq | CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS | |
publicationissue.issueNumber | 2 | |
publicationvolume.volumeNumber | 47 |