CEO pay-for-performance heterogeneity using quantile regression

dc.contributor.authorHallock, Kevin F.
dc.contributor.authorMadalozzo, Regina Carla
dc.contributor.authorReck, Clayton G.
dc.coverage.cidadeNova Iorquept_BR
dc.coverage.paisEstados Unidospt_BR
dc.creatorHallock, Kevin F.
dc.creatorMadalozzo, Regina Carla
dc.creatorReck, Clayton G.
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-07T23:45:59Z
dc.date.available2022-11-07T23:45:59Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.description.otherWe provide some examples of how quantile regression can be used to investigate heterogeneity in pay–firm size and pay-performance relationships for U.S. CEOs. For example, do conditionally (predicted) high-wage managers have a stronger relationship between pay and performance than conditionally low-wage managers? Our results using data over a decade show, for some standard specifications, there is considerable heterogeneity in the returns to firm performance across the conditional distribution of wages. Quantile regression adds substantially to our understanding of the pay-performance relationship. This heterogeneity is masked when using more standard empirical techniques.pt_BR
dc.format.mediumDigitalpt_BR
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4657
dc.identifier.wpe08/julpt_BR
dc.language.isoInglêspt_BR
dc.publisherCornell University Center for Advanced Human Resource Studiespt_BR
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCAHRS Working Paper Seriespt_BR
dc.rights.licenseO INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DOS USUÁRIOS INDIVIDUAIS VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITORpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsExecutive compensationpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsQuantile regressionpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsPay and performancept_BR
dc.titleCEO pay-for-performance heterogeneity using quantile regressionpt_BR
dc.typeworking paper
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.identifier.sourceUrihttp://catalog.library.cornell.edu/
local.subject.cnpqCiências Sociais Aplicadaspt_BR
local.typeWorking Paperpt_BR

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