Government Appointment Discretion and Judicial Independence: preference and opportunistic effects on Brazilian Courts

dc.contributor.authorLopes, Felipe
dc.contributor.authorPAULO FURQUIM DE AZEVEDO
dc.coverage.cidadeSão Paulopt_BR
dc.coverage.paisBrasilpt_BR
dc.creatorLopes, Felipe
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-20T14:37:41Z
dc.date.available2023-07-20T14:37:41Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.description.abstractThe prolific literature on de facto judicial independence misses a key variable: the government’s discretion over the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In this paper we explore a distinct feature of the Brazilian judiciary system to assess political influence due to government appointment discretion. As there are two courts, the STF (Supreme Federal Court) and the STJ (Superior Court of Justice), which deal with similar matters and have different restrictions on the appointment of their members, it is possible to compare the degree of political influence to which they are subject. We test (1) whether there are differences in the degree of political influence depending on the president’s discretion over the nomination of a justice, and (2) whether the justices actively benefit the party of the president who has appointed them. We find evidence of the former, but not of the latter effect.
dc.description.otherThe prolific literature on de facto judicial independence misses a key variable: the government’s discretion over the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In this paper we explore a distinct feature of the Brazilian judiciary system to assess political influence due to government appointment discretion. As there are two courts, the STF (Supreme Federal Court) and the STJ (Superior Court of Justice), which deal with similar matters and have different restrictions on the appointment of their members, it is possible to compare the degree of political influence to which they are subject. We test (1) whether there are differences in the degree of political influence depending on the president’s discretion over the nomination of a justice, and (2) whether the justices actively benefit the party of the president who has appointed them. We find evidence of the former, but not of the latter effect.pt_BR
dc.format.extent34 p.pt_BR
dc.format.mediumDigitalpt_BR
dc.identifier.issueBEWP 236/2016
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/5889
dc.language.isoInglêspt_BR
dc.publisherInsperpt_BR
dc.relation.ispartofseriesInsper Working Paperpt_BR
dc.rights.licenseO INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DO USUÁRIO VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITORpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsJudicial independencept_BR
dc.subject.keywordsSupreme Courtpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsappointment discretionpt_BR
dc.titleGovernment Appointment Discretion and Judicial Independence: preference and opportunistic effects on Brazilian Courtspt_BR
dc.typeworking paper
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.subject.cnpqCiências Sociais Aplicadaspt_BR
local.typeWorking Paperpt_BR
relation.isAuthorOfPublication25ce9242-4c33-4eb0-8fd6-db1b8dc52452
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery25ce9242-4c33-4eb0-8fd6-db1b8dc52452

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