Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/5261
Type: Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso
Title: Classes de Ações Ordinárias com Voto Plural em Estruturas Alavancadas de Controle
Author: Oliveira, Fernando Tendolini
Advisor: Buzatto, Ana Cristina Von Gusseck Kleindienst
Advisor: Buschinelli, Gabriel Saad Kik
Academic degree: Especialização (Lato sensu)
Publication Date: 2021
Original Abstract: Os primeiros vinte anos do século XXI são terreno de farta poupança e dinamismo dos investidores, que convergem com momento ímpar de criatividade empresarial, avanço tecnológico e mudanças nos hábitos e nas vidas das pessoas. E carregam a pujança das ofertas públicas iniciais – IPOs e acesso aos mercados de ações, com expoentes empresariais que adotaram classe especial de ações ordinárias com voto plural. O sucesso de suas empreitadas e a valorização de suas ações abrigam a defesa da singularidade do acionista controlador na condução dos negócios e o seu encastelamento dos outros acionistas.
Keywords in original language : Ação Ordinária com Voto Plural
Acionista Controlador
Estruturas Alavancadas de Controle
Governança Corporativa
Poder de Controle
Abstract: The first twenty years of the 21st century are ground for savings abundance and investment dynamism, which converge with the unique moment in business creativity, technological advances and changes to people's habits and daily-lives. These years carry the strength of initial public offerings - IPOs, access to stock markets and business icons adopting special class multiple voting shares. The growth of these names and appreciation in the value of shares midst public traded stocks support the defense of their founders and controlling shareholders´ supremacy in the conducting of business and in isolating themselves from ordinary shareholders. The following study tracks the worldwide revival of control enhancement mechanisms and outlines the initial drafts on how Brazilian legal framework will come through. It also underpins the changes that will guide Brazilian corporate law and their direct implication to multiple voting share permissions and how they unfolded in other countries. Brazilian legal doctrine does not see equity and controlling stake detachment as strange and this paper will walk through dual-class shares, as well as leveraged control structures, preferred shares, super-preferred shares, golden shares and multiple voting shares features. Brazilian companies that choose super-powered common share class find their way abroad since they are not allowed under current regulation to trade locally. Most of the defense for this arrangement points to the entrepreneur's long-term view and to their protection against market short-term opportunism and controlling dilution that may come from merger and acquisition needs or sequential capital increases. Critics, for their part, put the spotlight on decades of corporate governance evolution, parity between shareholding and voting and one share one vote doctrine to dim corporate bylaws shunts in many situations of shareholder, interest or agency conflicts. We cannot accurately foresee the answer to these current questions for years to come. Nonetheless, one should face them without the shackles of paradigms, under the risk of losing by obsolescence of our legal territory. But not without disregarding red flags on vices and possible remedies.
Language: Português
CNPq Area: Ciências Sociais Aplicadas
Copyright: TODOS OS DOCUMENTOS DESTA COLEÇÃO PODEM SER ACESSADOS, MANTENDO-SE OS DIREITOS DOS AUTORES PELA CITAÇÃO DA ORIGEM
Appears in Collections:LL.M. em Direito Societário

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