Coleção de Artigos Acadêmicos
URI permanente para esta coleçãohttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/3227
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13 resultados
Resultados da Pesquisa
Artigo Científico Updating variational (Bewley) preferences(2021) JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Santos, AnaArtigo Científico Choquet expected discounted utility(2022) JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Bastianello, LorenzoArtigo Científico Dynamically consistent objective and subjective rationality(2022) JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Bastianello, Lorenzo; Santos, AnaArtigo Científico Updating pricing rules(2018) Araujo, Aloisio; Chateauneuf, Alain; JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Holanda, BrunoArtigo Científico Financial market structures revealed by pricing rules: Efficient complete markets are prevalent(2018) Araujo, Aloisio; Chateauneuf, Alain; JOSÉ HELENO FAROArtigo Científico Ambiguity aversion in the long run: “To disagree, we must also agree”(2016) Araujo, Aloisio; Silva, Pietro da; JOSÉ HELENO FAROArtigo Científico Variational bewley preferences(2015) JOSÉ HELENO FAROArtigo Científico Independence and variational bewley preferences: a note(2020) Bastianello, Lorenzo; JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Teles, FláviaThis note studies some alternatives and weak versions of the Independence axiom in a decision theoretic framework under uncertainty. We propose a characterization of this axiom using a property called Weight Independence. Moreover we study how the Independence axiom is related with the Variational Bewley model of Faro [2015]. We show that Variational Bewley preferences satisfy a weaker form of independence called Independence for Constant Weights. This topic gives us the opportunity to discuss the pioneeristic contributions of David Schmeidler on the weakening of the Independence axiom.Artigo Científico Dynamic objective and subjective rationality(2019) JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Lefort, Jean PhilippeWe characterize prior-by-prior Bayesian updating using a model proposed by Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler (2010) that jointly considers objective and subjective rationality. These rationality concepts are subject to the Be wley unanimity rule and maxmin expected utility, respectively, with a common set of priors and the same utility over consequences. We use this setup with two preference relations to develop a novel rationale for full Bayesian updating of maxmin expected utility preferences.Artigo Científico Ignorance and competence in choices under uncertainty(2014) Casaca, Paulo; Chateauneuf, Alain; JOSÉ HELENO FAROWe propose a model of decision making that captures reluctance to bet when the decision maker (DM) perceives that she lacks adequate information or expertise about the underlying contingencies. On the other hand, the same DM can prefer to bet in situations where she feels specially knowledgeable or competent even if the underlying contingencies have vague likelihoods. This separation in terms of sources of uncertainty is motivated by the Heath and Tversky’s competence hypothesis as well as by the Fox and Tversky’s comparative ignorance effect. Formally, we characterize preference relations % over Anscombe – Aumann acts represented by J (f) = min p∈C A u(f)dp + max p∈C A c u(f)dp, where u is an affine utility index on consequences, C is a nonempty, convex and (weak∗ ) compact subset of probabilities measures, and A is a referential chance event. In this model there is a clear separation of ambiguity attitudes. The case E ⊂ A captures possible familiar target events while the case E ⊂ A c might refer to the case of relative ignorance concerning related contingencies. This model captures a special case of event dependence of ambiguity attitudes in which the well known maxmin model is a special case. We also characterize the case where we have a Choquet Expected Utility representation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D81.