Coleção Insper Business and Economics Working Papers
URI permanente para esta coleçãohttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/5740
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4 resultados
Resultados da Pesquisa
Working Paper Economic Incentives or Communication: How Different Are their Effects on Trust(2016) TATIANA IWAI; PAULO FURQUIM DE AZEVEDOThis study investigates the effects of economic incentives and communication on the cognitive and behavioral responses after an alleged trust violation. We argue that these responses depend on the type of solution used to foster cooperation between agents. On the cognitive level, we compare the effects that structural (economic incentives) and motivational (communication) solutions exert on trusting beliefs and trusting intentions after an adverse event. On the behavioral level, we compare these effects on the willingness to bear risk. Our experiment shows that, after a negative event, relationships wherein communication is used to foster cooperation are associated to greater external causal attribution, greater perceived benevolence/integrity, and greater willingness to reconcile and to accept risks related to other's behavior. These findings suggest that relationships based on motivational solutions are more resilient to negative events than one based on structural solutions.Working Paper Government Appointment Discretion and Judicial Independence: preference and opportunistic effects on Brazilian Courts(2017) Lopes, Felipe; PAULO FURQUIM DE AZEVEDOThe prolific literature on de facto judicial independence misses a key variable: the government’s discretion over the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In this paper we explore a distinct feature of the Brazilian judiciary system to assess political influence due to government appointment discretion. As there are two courts, the STF (Supreme Federal Court) and the STJ (Superior Court of Justice), which deal with similar matters and have different restrictions on the appointment of their members, it is possible to compare the degree of political influence to which they are subject. We test (1) whether there are differences in the degree of political influence depending on the president’s discretion over the nomination of a justice, and (2) whether the justices actively benefit the party of the president who has appointed them. We find evidence of the former, but not of the latter effect.Working Paper Measuring the Efficiency of Brazilian Courts from 2006 to 2008: What Do the Numbers Tell Us?(2011) Luk-Tai Yeung, Luciana; PAULO FURQUIM DE AZEVEDOThis paper uses a linear optimization method called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure the efficiency of Brazilian State Courts during the years of 2006 to 2008. Our results show that relative efficiency varies substantially across the states. There is a group of courts that consistently top performs in the sample. On the other hand, there is a group of consistent poor performers, as well a group of average performers. Yet, the biggest problem seems to be with a group of State Courts with very unstable results, which might indicate serious problems in data collection and/or measurement. DEA also shows that the lack of resources should not be pointed as the main reason for inefficiency, since inefficient courts could improve the number of adjudications without changing the level of resources employed.Working Paper Private Entrepreneurs In Public Services: A Longitudinal Examination Of Outsourcing and Statization Of Prisons(2011) SANDRO CABRAL; SERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINI; PAULO FURQUIM DE AZEVEDOSome fear that the profit-maximizing orientation of private entrepreneurs conflicts with societal goals expected in the provision of complex public services. Received contractual theories advocate that private involvement in public services will result in cost reductions at the expense of quality. Using prisons as our empirical context, we benefit from an event involving the outsourcing and subsequent statization of correctional facilities in Brazil. Triangulating between quantitative and qualitative information, we do not find evidence of quality deterioration in outsourced prisons and suggest that a key mechanism driving this result is the presence of public supervisors closely working on site with private entrepreneurs in a hybrid governance fashion. We then deliver a set of new propositions that move beyond hazard considerations to examine how the combination of heterogeneous public and private capabilities might yield learning and spillover effects unattainable through pure government management or full-fledged privatization.