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The Political Economy of Tyrannicide
(2024) Schwartsman, David Motta Nisencwajg
In this paper, we discuss tyrannicide as a rational political strategy and we evaluate its empirical effects on democratization. We first consider the murder of political leaders as a strategy inside basic selectorate competition, in selectorate theory, and we regard its equilibrium effects. We show that assassination risk can induce greater investment in public goods and pressure a reduction in coalition size and selectorate expansion. Then, using a staggered difference-indifferences strategy with Callaway and Santana’s reweighting estimator, we compare countries whose leaders survived murder attempts by chance with countries who leaders were killed. We observe evidence that the assassinations of dictators can favor democratization, increasing their countries polity-2 index by 3 to 4 points over time in the aggregate, with a lasting effect. We find weaker evidence for assassination of leaders in general.