JOSÉ HELENO FARO
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Working Paper Variational Bewley Preferences(2014) JOSÉ HELENO FAROWorking Paper Dynamic Objective and Subjective Rationality(2013) JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Lefortz, Jean PhilippeThe objective and subjective rationality model characterizes decision makers (DMs) by two preference relations over uncertainty acts and provides a dual perspective of rationality. The Örst preference reáects choices that are rational in an objective sense and the second ones express choices labeled subjective rational. While an objective ranking means that the DM can convince others that she is right in making them, in a subjective choice the DM cannot be convinced that she is wrong in making them. Objective and subjective preferences are represented, respectively, by a Bewleyís unanimity rule and a maxmin expected utility, both representations holding the same set of multiple priors. We propose and axiomatize a dynamic Bayesian model for the objective and subjective rationality theory. The static model specifies some set of prior probabilities, which should be then updated in the light of new and relevant information. We provide two new axioms on the interplay of unconditional objective relations and conditional subjective preferences. Such axioms ensure that a conditional subjective relation is also a maxmin expected utility preference and the corresponding set of priors is derived from the full Bayesian updating, i.e., it is generated by the prior-by-prior updating of all unconditional probabilities. Our main result thus provides a novel foundation for sequential consistent maxmin preferences as well as for the full Bayesian updating. Finally, we study the dynamics of objective preferences and its relations with our main result.Working Paper Ignorance and Competence in Choices Under Uncertainty(2013) Casaca, Paulo; Chateauneuf, Alain; JOSÉ HELENO FAROWorking Paper Cobb-Douglas Preferences under Uncertainty(2012) JOSÉ HELENO FAROThis paper axiomatizes Cobb-Douglas preferences under uncertainty. First, we extend the original Trockel (1989)'s axiomatic foundation to a general state space framework based on the Strong Homotheticity Axiom, obtaining also the incomplete case a la Bewley (2002). We show that this key axiom for the Cobb Douglas expected utility speci cation is refuted by Ellsberg's uncertainty aver sion behavioral pattern. Our main result provides a set of meaningful axioms characterizing Cobb-Douglas Min-Expected Utility preferences, an important class of uncertainty averse preferences for studying the consequences of am biguity in nance and other elds. Finally, we present brie y how to obtain more general representations like the variational case.Tese Essays on Ambiguity and Decision Theory(2023) Wang, Henrique Yu JiunnEsta tese analisa três casos diferentes relacionados à incerteza. O primeiro capítulo estuda um modelo teórico de conluio que assume ambiguidade em relação à demanda. O segundo capítulo estuda a decisão dos juízes em casos relacionados à saúde e como a experiência neste assunto muda seu comportamento. O terceiro capítulo estuda como os casos de corrupção na mídia afetam as decisões dos juízes em casos de corrupção de outros ramos do judiciárioWorking Paper Efficient Complete Markets Are the Rule Rather thanthe Exception(2015) JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Chateauneuf, Alain; Araujo, AloisioLivro Introdução à Teoria da Escolha(2005) JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Castro, Luciano Irineu deEsta monografia está dividida em quatro partes: escolha sob certeza, escolha sob risco e incerteza, escolha sob ambigüidade e escolha social. Antes de descrever o que contém cada uma das partes, vamos esclarecer a distinção entre risco, incerteza e ambigüidade.Tese Stakeholder Governance and Decision-Making: Dealing with Preference Heterogeneity and Uncertainty(2024) Freire, Vitor de Barros SantosThis dissertation examines mechanisms of strategic stakeholder governance, advancing the understanding of how firms can incorporate diverse stakeholder perspectives in high-level strategic decision-making forums such as corporate boards. Central to this research objective is the understanding that value creation demands governance structures that reconcile heterogeneous stakeholder interests and, at the same time, deal with potentially escalating decision-making costs and promote adaptation to changing circumstances. The dissertation is comprised of three chapters examining the nuanced challenges and mechanisms concerning corporate boards, blending theoretical propositions and empirical testing using laboratory experimental methods. The initial chapter presents a decision-based theory of stakeholder governance. It explores the interplay between stakeholder engagement and decision rights allocation within corporate boards, when facing contingencies like the boundaries on stakeholder claims (the extent of stakeholders' interests considered) and the nature of the decision problem under consideration. The chapter follows a comparative organizational analysis and examines different governance patterns that fit these contingencies to propose a combination of aspects related to the allocation of decision rights, corporate objectives, and deliberation mechanisms aligned with the contingencies to facilitate decision-making and adaptation, resulting in a theory of stakeholder governance explaining the arrangement of decision-making forums to accommodate distinct stakeholder demands. The second chapter empirically examines a specific mechanism of board decision-making under uncertainty. The research investigates conditions in which boards tend to make choices that avoid negative externalities and safeguard vulnerable stakeholders. The chapter tests the hypothesis that when facing uncertain outcomes and divergent opinions, boards following a unanimous rule for decision tend to opt for choices that mitigate negative externalities over higher financial gains. The experimental results show that, under such conditions, boards have a surprisingly strong preference for the alternative that avoids negative externalities, even when it entails lower financial results. The chapter then investigates the factors leading the boards to adopt such a cautious attitude and argues that besides an increased perception of uncertainty in groups, the critical influence of the unanimity rule is likely a main factor. The final chapter, then, delves into the comparative effects of the unanimity rule in comparison with the widely adopted majority decision rule. This chapter builds upon the same behavioral mechanisms discussed in the second chapter and examines the trade-offs between adopting a unanimity rule versus a majority vote. Experimental results show that unanimity enhances the board's tendency towards precautionary decisions and also increases confidence in the collective decision, yet it also necessitates more deliberation efforts. The extra efforts can complicate decision-making in business environments that require prompt decisions, suggesting a critical trade-off between inclusive decision-making and swift decision-making. In sum, this dissertation sheds light on the intricate balance between managing heterogeneous stakeholder demands and dealing with the decision-making costs that emerge when their multiple demands are considered. It offers valuable insights into how governance structures can be designed to manage the tensions between diverse stakeholder interests, the decision-making costs of considering diverse interests, and the need for adaptation in changing business landscapes. The findings underscore the importance of considering both the necessity of inclusiveness regarding stakeholders' interests and the decision-making costs permeating deliberation mechanisms. This dissertation therefore contributes to the evolving literature on stakeholder governance by examining decision-making processes, their underlying theoretical determinants, and the mechanisms that decision-making forums may adopt to reconcile multiple stakeholder demands.Working Paper Updating Pricing Rules(2016) Araujo, Aloisio; Chateauneuf, Alain; JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Holanda, BrunoThis paper studies the problem of updating the super-replication prices of na arbitrage-free market in a multiperiod setting. We introduce a set of standard properties and a (weak) version of Dynamic Consistency to characterize the updated pricing rules by the Full Bayesian Rule. Since different pricing rules are related to different kinds of frictions on the financial markets, this study allow us to analyze the evolution of the market structure when new informations are revealed. We also provide a geometric characterization for the pricing rules that characterizes frictionless incomplete markets. This geometric property is useful to demonstrate that the incomplete frictionless market structure is invariant under updating when a non trivial updating condition between the set of risk-neutral measures and revealed information is present.Artigo Científico Alpha-maxmin as an aggregation of two selve(2024) Chateauneuf, Alain; JOSÉ HELENO FARO; Tallon, Jean-Marc; Vergopoulos, VassiliThis paper offers a novel perspective on the -maxmin model, taking its components as originating from distinct selves within the decision maker. Drawing from the notion of multiple selves prevalent in inter-temporal decision-making contexts, we present an aggregation approach where each self possesses its own preference relation. Contrary to existing interpretations, these selves are not merely a means to interpret the decision maker’s overall utility function but are considered as primitives. Through consistency requirements, we derive an -maxmin representation as an outcome of a convex combination of the preferences of two distinct selves. We first explore a setting involving objective information and then move on to a fully subjective derivation.