The “Guarding the Guardians” Problem: An Analysis of the Organizational Performance of an Internal Affairs Division

Página do item simplificado
dc.contributor.authorSANDRO CABRAL
dc.contributor.authorSERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINI
dc.coverage.cidadeNão informadopt_BR
dc.coverage.paisNão Informadopt_BR
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-11T22:07:11Z
dc.date.available2022-10-11T22:07:11Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.description.otherPublic administration scholars have proposed that efficient monitoring and accountability are key performance elements in public services. We contribute to this debate by focusing on the so-called “guarding the guardians” dilemma: monitoring commissions made up of public officials who may refrain from punishing their peers and turn a blind eye to certain deviations. In the police, this is the case of internal affairs divisions (IADs), which are organizations crafted to monitor the behavior of police officers. We expand the existing literature by proposing a set of hypotheses that are tested using a distinct data set containing detailed information on investigations against police officers performed by an IAD. We assess the organizational performance of the IAD by examining how various factors influence competing hazards of acquittal, mild and harsh punishment of the implicated officers. We find that high-ranking, high-tenured officers are less harshly punished with termination of duty, whereas the opposite effect is found with respect to cases with extensive media coverage. We also find that cases judged by specialized investigation officers increase the likelihood of punishment compared to cases assigned to temporary, rotating commissions, especially for cases with a long time span.pt_BR
dc.format.extentp. 797-829pt_BR
dc.format.mediumDigitalpt_BR
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muu001pt_BR
dc.identifier.issue3pt_BR
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4253
dc.identifier.volume25pt_BR
dc.language.isoInglêspt_BR
dc.publisherOxford University Presspt_BR
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Public Administration Research and Theorypt_BR
dc.rights.licenseO INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DOS USUÁRIOS INDIVIDUAIS VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITOR.pt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsNão informadopt_BR
dc.titleThe “Guarding the Guardians” Problem: An Analysis of the Organizational Performance of an Internal Affairs Divisionpt_BR
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.identifier.sourceUrihttps://academic.oup.com/jpart/article/25/3/797/959027
local.subject.cnpqCiências Sociais Aplicadaspt_BR
local.typeArtigo Científicopt_BR
relation.isAuthorOfPublication76c81ecd-5a8e-48de-9d12-b62cebc2e626
relation.isAuthorOfPublication4ee022f9-7466-405d-ae1a-6b1e33f611e8
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery4ee022f9-7466-405d-ae1a-6b1e33f611e8
Arquivos
Pacote Original
Agora exibindo 1 - 1 de 1
N/D
Nome:
R_Artigo_2014_The guarding the guardians_TC.pdf
Tamanho:
827.57 KB
Formato:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Descrição:
R_Artigo_2014_The guarding the guardians_TC
Baixar
Licença do Pacote
Agora exibindo 1 - 1 de 1
N/D
Nome:
license.txt
Tamanho:
282 B
Formato:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Descrição:
Baixar
Coleções
Coleção de Artigos Acadêmicos