Bad for practice? Reconciling alternative views on managerial attitudes and their impact on organizational performance

dc.contributor.authorIslam, Gazi
dc.contributor.authorSERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINI
dc.contributor.authorMesquita, Luiz
dc.coverage.cidadeNão informadopt_BR
dc.coverage.paisNão Informadopt_BR
dc.creatorIslam, Gazi
dc.creatorMesquita, Luiz
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-11T19:35:52Z
dc.date.available2022-10-11T19:35:52Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.description.otherPurpose The purpose of this paper is to reconcile alternative managerial views regarding self‐serving behavior in organizations: while some propose that such behavior is commonplace and detrimental to performance, and suggest policies to counteract such conduct, critics contend that such policies generate distrust and diminish performance. The authors integrate elements from agency and interactional justice theories, and hypotheses that managerial attitudes not related to self‐interest can influence behaviors often attributed to the desire to curb self‐interest, and vice‐versa. Design/methodology/approach The authors employ structural equation modeling based on survey data from 387 team‐leaders from both Brazil and the USA. Findings An asymmetric relation is found in the aforementioned theoretical “cross‐talk:” managers concerned with self‐interest tend to devise policies solely focused on curbing self‐interest, while managers concerned with justice not only adopt justice‐enhancing practices but also certain incentivizing agency‐related practices which jointly increase performance. Research limitations/implications By proposing and testing theoretical interactions between agency and justice theories, support is found for both enthusiasts and critics of self‐interestedness, but pointedly they occur in different domains. Practical implications The results suggest that managers should foster interactional justice, promoting incentivizing agency‐related behaviors that may be interpreted as justice‐seeking, while avoiding those that send a message of distrust. Originality/value To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is one of the first empirical papers directly addressing the ongoing debate raised by Ghoshal and others on the merits of managerial theories based on the assumption of self‐interest.pt_BR
dc.format.extentp. 208-225pt_BR
dc.format.mediumDigitalpt_BR
dc.identifier.doi10.1108/1536-541211273874pt_BR
dc.identifier.issn1536-5433pt_BR
dc.identifier.issue3pt_BR
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4241
dc.identifier.volume10pt_BR
dc.language.isoInglêspt_BR
dc.publisherEsmeraldpt_BR
dc.relation.ispartofManagement Researchpt_BR
dc.relation.urihttps://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/1536-541211273874/full/htmlpt_BR
dc.rights.licenseO INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DOS USUÁRIOS INDIVIDUAIS VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITORpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsBrazilpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsUnited States of Americapt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsOrganizational performancept_BR
dc.subject.keywordsManagerspt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsBusiness policypt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsJusticept_BR
dc.subject.keywordsSelf-interestpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsAgency theorypt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsInteractional justicept_BR
dc.titleBad for practice? Reconciling alternative views on managerial attitudes and their impact on organizational performancept_BR
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.subject.cnpqCiências Sociais Aplicadaspt_BR
local.typeArtigo Científicopt_BR
relation.isAuthorOfPublication4ee022f9-7466-405d-ae1a-6b1e33f611e8
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery4ee022f9-7466-405d-ae1a-6b1e33f611e8
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