Reputation and the flow of information in repeated games

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dc.contributor.authorEDUARDO FAINGOLD
dc.coverage.cidadeNão informadopt_BR
dc.coverage.paisNão Informadopt_BR
dc.date.accessioned2022-12-10T16:25:18Z
dc.date.available2022-12-10T16:25:18Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.description.notesTexto completopt_BR
dc.description.otherEquilibrium payoff bounds from reputation effects are derived for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in which a long-run player interacts frequently with a population of short-run players and the monitoring technology scales with the length of the period of interaction. The bounds depend on the monitoring technology through the flow of information, a measure of signal informativeness per unit of time based on relative entropy. Examples are shown where, under complete information, the set of equilibrium payoffs of the long-run player converges, as the period length tends to zero, to the set of static equilibrium payoffs, whereas when the game is perturbed by a small ex ante probability on commitment types, reputation effects remain powerful in the high-frequency limit.pt_BR
dc.format.extentp. 1697-1723pt_BR
dc.format.mediumDigitalpt_BR
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/ECTA11965pt_BR
dc.identifier.issue4pt_BR
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4879
dc.identifier.volume88pt_BR
dc.language.isoInglêspt_BR
dc.publisherThe Econometric Societypt_BR
dc.relation.ispartofEconometricapt_BR
dc.rights.licenseO INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DOS USUÁRIOS INDIVIDUAIS VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITORpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsReputationpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsCommitmentpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsImperfect monitoringpt_BR
dc.subject.keywordsHigh-frequency repeated gamespt_BR
dc.titleReputation and the flow of information in repeated gamespt_BR
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.identifier.sourceUrihttps://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11965
local.subject.cnpqCiências Sociais Aplicadaspt_BR
local.typeArtigo Científicopt_BR
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationaa879647-fa0d-40da-b742-5f1c7c879b4e
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryaa879647-fa0d-40da-b742-5f1c7c879b4e

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