Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence

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dc.contributor.authorMoita, Rodrigo Menon Simões
dc.contributor.authorPaiva, Claudio
dc.coverage.paisNão Informadopt_BR
dc.creatorMoita, Rodrigo Menon Simões
dc.creatorPaiva, Claudio
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-05T14:15:50Z
dc.date.available2024-01-05T14:15:50Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.description.otherThe early work of Stigler (1971) treats the regulatory process as the arbitration of conflicting economic and political interests rather than a pure welfare-maximizing effort. This paper builds on these ideas and models the regulatory process as a game where the industry-lobby, consumers-voters, and a regulator-politician interact to define the regulated price, in alternating electoral and non-electoral periods. The equilibrium that emerges consists of a fully rational political price cycle in a regulated industry. Using monthly data for regulated gasoline and electricity prices from Brazil, we find strong evidence pointing towards the existence of electoral price cycles in both markets.pt_BR
dc.format.extentp. 94-121pt_BR
dc.format.mediumDigitalpt_BR
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.l257/pol5.L94pt_BR
dc.identifier.issn1945-7731pt_BR
dc.identifier.issn1945-774Xpt_BR
dc.identifier.issue1pt_BR
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/6303
dc.identifier.volume5pt_BR
dc.language.isoInglêspt_BR
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationpt_BR
dc.relation.ispartofAmerican Economic Journal. Economic Policy (AEJ Policy)pt_BR
dc.rights.licenseO INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DO USUÁRIO VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITOR.pt_BR
dc.titlePolitical Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidencept_BR
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.identifier.sourceUrihttps://www.jstor.org/stable/23358338
local.subject.cnpqCiências Exatas e da Terrapt_BR
local.subject.cnpqCiências Sociais Aplicadaspt_BR
local.typeArtigo Científicopt_BR

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