Rule is a dual character concept

Página do item simplificado
dc.contributor.authorAlmeida, Guilherme da Franca Couto Fernandes de
dc.contributor.authorStruchiner, Noel
dc.contributor.authorHannikainen, Ivar Rodriguez
dc.creatorAlmeida, Guilherme da Franca Couto Fernandes de
dc.creatorStruchiner, Noel
dc.creatorHannikainen, Ivar Rodriguez
dc.date.accessioned2024-05-02T19:57:50Z
dc.date.available2024-05-02T19:57:50Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.description.abstractRecent experimental work revealed that rule violation judgments are sensitive to morality. For instance: when someone blamelessly violates a rule's text, about half of the participants say that the rule was violated, with the remainder saying that it wasn't. Why is that so? Current evidence is compatible with three distinct explanations. According to the pragmatic view, rule violation judgments pragmatically imply judgments of blame. Hence, the results don't tell us anything about the concept of rule itself. Instead, they are simply caused by conversational pragmatics. On the other hand, the mixed character view states that the concept of rule simultaneously combines text and purpose into a single criterion. Finally, the dual character view states that the concept of rule is similar to the concepts of scientist and father. These concepts have two distinct sets of criteria, each sufficient to determine one sense in which the concept applies. One of the criteria is descriptive, while the other is normative. In this paper, we report the results of four studies designed to adjudicate between these alternatives. Studies 1A and 1B find results that are incompatible with the pragmatic view, while Study 2 shows that the concept of rule behaves in a way that is notably different than some mixed character concepts on a linguistic test. Finally, Studies 3–5 support the idea that the concept of rule has a dual character. We consider the jurisprudential implications of each alternative.en
dc.formatDigital
dc.format.extent16 p.
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105259
dc.identifier.issn1873-7838
dc.identifier.issn0010-0277
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/6627
dc.language.isoen
dc.relation.ispartofCognition
dc.subjectRule violationen
dc.subjectThe concept of ruleen
dc.subjectGeneral jurisprudenceen
dc.subjectExperimental jurisprudenceen
dc.titleRule is a dual character concept
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.identifier.sourceUrihttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027722002475?via%3Dihub
local.publisher.countryNão Informado
local.subject.cnpqCIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS
publicationvolume.volumeNumber230
Arquivos
Pacote Original
Agora exibindo 1 - 2 de 2
N/D
Nome:
Artigo_Rule_is_a_dual_character_concept_TC.pdf
Tamanho:
2.75 MB
Formato:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Baixar
Imagem de Miniatura
Nome:
Acesso_Primeira Pagina_Rule is a dual character concept.pdf
Tamanho:
252.53 KB
Formato:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Baixar
Licença do Pacote
Agora exibindo 1 - 1 de 1
N/D
Nome:
license.txt
Tamanho:
236 B
Formato:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Descrição:
Baixar
Coleções
Coleção de Artigos Acadêmicos