Electoral Rules, Political Competition and Fiscal Expenditures: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities

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dc.contributor.authorSERGIO PINHEIRO FIRPO
dc.contributor.authorChamon, Marcos
dc.contributor.authorJOÃO MANOEL PINHO DE MELLO
dc.contributor.authorPieri, Renan Gomes De
dc.coverage.paisNão Informadopt_BR
dc.creatorChamon, Marcos
dc.creatorPieri, Renan Gomes De
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-11T15:46:37Z
dc.date.available2022-10-11T15:46:37Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.description.notesTrabalho Completopt_BR
dc.description.otherWe exploit a discontinuity in the rules of Brazilian mayoral elections to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on fiscal policy choices. In municipalities with fewer than 200,000 voters, mayors are elected under a plurality voting system. In all other municipalities, a runoff election takes place between the top two candidates if neither achieves the majority of votes. Our results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current expenditures, particularly personnel expenditures. The impact is larger when incumbents can run for re-election, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in officept_BR
dc.format.extentp. 19-38pt_BR
dc.format.mediumDigitalpt_BR
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2017.1414184pt_BR
dc.identifier.issn1743-9140pt_BR
dc.identifier.issue1pt_BR
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4231
dc.identifier.volume55pt_BR
dc.language.isoInglêspt_BR
dc.publisherTaylor & Francispt_BR
dc.relation.ispartofThe Journal of Development Studiespt_BR
dc.rights.licenseO INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DO USUÁRIO VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITOR.pt_BR
dc.titleElectoral Rules, Political Competition and Fiscal Expenditures: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Brazilian Municipalitiespt_BR
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.identifier.sourceUrihttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2017.1414184
local.subject.cnpqCiências Humanaspt_BR
local.typeArtigo Científicopt_BR
relation.isAuthorOfPublication1063735c-3cb1-4177-82ac-0d9814544887
relation.isAuthorOfPublication6e3d1f3d-a3fc-4951-8adc-af602f1343d2
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery1063735c-3cb1-4177-82ac-0d9814544887
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