Assessing the performance of voluntary environmental agreements under high monitoring costs: Evidence from the Brazilian Amazon

Página do item simplificado
dc.contributor.authorBRUNO VARELLA MIRANDA
dc.contributor.authorOliveira, Gustavo Magalhães de
dc.creatorOliveira, Gustavo Magalhães de
dc.date.accessioned2024-05-06T19:35:08Z
dc.date.available2024-05-06T19:35:08Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.description.abstractVoluntary environmental arrangements generally coexist with State-based and private rules, creating a property rights system that legitimizes certain behaviors. In a world of positive transaction costs, legitimacy ensues from imperfect monitoring activities, opening room for opportunism. In this paper, we discuss how the existence of multiple rules in a scenario of high monitoring costs affects the performance of an environmental policy. We discuss the case of deferred prosecution agreements (TAC, acronym in Portuguese), which are voluntary arrangements designed with the goal of incentivizing slaughterhouses to monitor the environmental practices of ranchers in the Brazilian Amazon. More specifically, we study how the signature of a TAC agreement affects deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazônia Legal region at the municipality level. This paper adopts a difference-in-differences approach to analyze a sample of Brazilian municipalities between 2006 and 2017. Our results, which remain robust across alternative estimators and subsamples, show that the signature of a TAC agreement increases deforestation rates by 0.2 standard deviations. We argue that the signature of a TAC agreement, by creating an imperfect proxy for “good behavior” that enables both compliant and non-compliant organizations to access credit, may incentivize deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon.en
dc.formatDigital
dc.format.extent12 p.
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ecolecon.2023.107982
dc.identifier.issn0921-8009
dc.identifier.issn1873-6106
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/6641
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherElsevier B.V.
dc.relation.ispartofEcological Economics
dc.subjectBrazilian Amazonen
dc.subjectCattle supply chainen
dc.subjectTransaction costsen
dc.subjectVoluntary agreementsen
dc.titleAssessing the performance of voluntary environmental agreements under high monitoring costs: Evidence from the Brazilian Amazon
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.identifier.sourceUrihtps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800923002458
local.publisher.countryNão Informado
local.subject.cnpqCIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS
publicationvolume.volumeNumber214
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationed06c7f4-4558-4d95-b1ff-47a32f3f4e1b
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryed06c7f4-4558-4d95-b1ff-47a32f3f4e1b
Arquivos
Pacote Original
Agora exibindo 1 - 2 de 2
N/D
Nome:
Artigo_Assessing_the_performance_of_voluntary_environmental_agreements_under_high_monitoring_costs_Evidence from the Brazilian Amazon_TC.pdf
Tamanho:
2.84 MB
Formato:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Baixar
Imagem de Miniatura
Nome:
Acesso_Primeira Pagina_Assessing the performance of voluntary environmental agreements under high monitoring costs Evidence from the Brazilian Amazon.pdf
Tamanho:
247.05 KB
Formato:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Baixar
Licença do Pacote
Agora exibindo 1 - 1 de 1
N/D
Nome:
license.txt
Tamanho:
236 B
Formato:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Descrição:
Baixar
Coleções
Coleção de Artigos Acadêmicos