Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem: https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4713
Tipo de Material: Artigo Científico
Titulo: Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties
Autor: Novaes, Lucas Martins
Fecha de Publicación: 2017
Resumen en ingles: This article shows that the disloyalty of political brokers causes party fragility. Lacking distinctive brands, organization, and activists to mobilize individuals, parties “hire” local notables to broker votes among a local, nonpartisan constituency. However, brokers may be unreliable agents, regularly changing political allegiances in search of better returns for their brokerage among the module of voters they control. This free agency from brokers hinders durable party–voter linkages and results in electorally vulnerable parties. Measuring how brokers influence parties is empirically complex, but taking advantage of the fact that in Brazil these agents are also local candidates, this article demonstrates the negative electoral consequences of brokers’ free agency on party performance. Natural experiments and an unexpected, temporary institutional reform that discouraged disloyalty for brokers demonstrate this relationship
Idioma: Inglês
Area del CNPq: Ciências Humanas
URI: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ajps.12331
Licencias de uso: O INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DO USUÁRIO VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITOR.
Notas: Texto completo
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