Monitoring the Governance of State-Owned Enterprises
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Autores
Coelho, Daphne
Teodorovicz, Thomaz
Fritscher, André Carlos Martínez
Café, Renata Motta
Ikawa, Jorge Norio Rezende
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Relatório de pesquisa
Data
2024
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State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are often justified for correcting market failures, providing essential public services, and fulfilling social objectives.
Yet, SOEs face unique governance challenges as agency conflicts usually increase with state ownership. This paper examines Brazil’s efforts to
address agency conflicts in SOEs, including new legislation (Law 13303 of 2016, the “Law on SOEs”) establishing stringent criteria for the appointment
of executives and for the accountability and a complementary monitoring mechanism known as IG-SEST. Using the difference-in-differences
methodology, we assess the impact of those interventions on SOE’s profitability and labor productivity. Although no significant effect of the
more-stringent governance requirements of the Law on SOEs was detected, the group of federal SOEs, which adopted the IG-SEST monitoring mechanism, significantly increased their profitability compared to similar municipal and state SOEs. Because IG-SEST anchored its indicators in corporate governance parameters specified in the Law on SOEs, this result can be interpreted as potential evidence that institutional changes might require complementary mechanisms for effective implementation. These findings are consistent with previous work suggesting that corporate governance might require broader institutional reforms, including fiscal policies to mitigate government action with a negative effect on the performance and solvency of SOEs.
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en
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