Remuneração de administradores em estatais e empresas privadas: uma análise sobre a remuneração total e variável
Autores
Silva, Samuel Severo da
Orientador
Isabella, Giuliana
Co-orientadores
Ribeiro, Priscila Fernandes
Citações na Scopus
Tipo de documento
Data
2022
Resumo
Este trabalho mede a diferença na remuneração total e variável das empresas estatais e privadas para as empresas de capital aberto que compõem o índice Ibovespa da B3, no período de 2009 a 2021. Foram utilizados dois métodos econométricos para avaliação das diferenças na remuneração, sendo o primeiro o PSM – propensity score matching, na modalidade do vizinho mais próximo para avaliação do escore de propensão pelo método probit e o segundo modelo econométrico para avaliação das diferenças foi o CEM – coarsened exact matching. A avaliação das diferenças foi realizada utilizando dados financeiros das empresas, como Total de Ativos, Patrimônio Líquido, Receita Líquida, entre outras informações. O grupo de tratamento foi associado as empresas estatais e o grupo de controle foi associado as empresas privadas. As diferenças entre os dois grupos (tratamento e controle) foram avaliadas individualmente por ano (2009 a 2021) nos dois modelos econométricos (PSM e CEM) e em todos os períodos o percentual de remuneração variável e a remuneração total do grupo de tratamento foi inferior ao grupo de controle, ou seja, empresas estatais pagam menos remuneração variável e remuneração total do que as empresas privadas. Esses achados encontram suporte na literatura principalmente porque as empresas estatais não têm como principal objetivo a obtenção do lucro e, consequentemente, não tem incentivo para pagamento de remunerações variáveis agressivas a seus administradores. As empresas estatais equilibram os objetivos de rentabilidade com os objetivos sociais e políticos.
This paper measures the difference in the total and variable compensation of state-owned and private companies to publicly traded companies that make up the B3 Ibovespa Index, in the period from 2009 to 2021. Two econometric methods were used to evaluate the differences in compensation, the first being the PSM – propensity score matching, in the nearest neighbor modality to assess the propensity score by the probit method and the second econometric model to assess the diferences was the CEM – coarsened exact matching. The assessment of differences was carried out using the companies financial data, such as Total Assets, Shareholders Equity, Net Revenue, among other information. The treatment group was associated with state-owned companies and the control group was associated with private companies. The differences between the two groups (treatment and control) were evaluated individually per year (2009 to 2021) in the two econometric models (PSM and CEM) and in all periods the percentage of variable compensation and the total compensation of the treatment group was lower than the control group, that is, state-owned companies pay less variable compensation and total compensation than private companies. These findings are supported by the literature mainly because state-owned companies do not have profit as their main objective and, consequently, do not have na incentive to pay aggressive variable compensation to their managers. State-owned companies balance profitability objectives with social and political objectives.
This paper measures the difference in the total and variable compensation of state-owned and private companies to publicly traded companies that make up the B3 Ibovespa Index, in the period from 2009 to 2021. Two econometric methods were used to evaluate the differences in compensation, the first being the PSM – propensity score matching, in the nearest neighbor modality to assess the propensity score by the probit method and the second econometric model to assess the diferences was the CEM – coarsened exact matching. The assessment of differences was carried out using the companies financial data, such as Total Assets, Shareholders Equity, Net Revenue, among other information. The treatment group was associated with state-owned companies and the control group was associated with private companies. The differences between the two groups (treatment and control) were evaluated individually per year (2009 to 2021) in the two econometric models (PSM and CEM) and in all periods the percentage of variable compensation and the total compensation of the treatment group was lower than the control group, that is, state-owned companies pay less variable compensation and total compensation than private companies. These findings are supported by the literature mainly because state-owned companies do not have profit as their main objective and, consequently, do not have na incentive to pay aggressive variable compensation to their managers. State-owned companies balance profitability objectives with social and political objectives.
Palavras-chave
Empresas privadas; Empresas estatais; Remuneração variável; CEM – coarsened exact matching; PSM – propensity score matching; Pagamento baseado em ações; Private entreprises; State-owned entreprises; Variable compensation; CEM – coarsened exact matching; PSM – propensity score matching, share-based payment
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URL da fonte
Título de Livro
URL na Scopus
Idioma
pt
Notas
Membros da banca
Isabella, Giuliana
Lazzarini, Sérgio Giovanetti
Arvate, Paulo Roberto
Área do Conhecimento CNPQ
CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS