SERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINI
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Working Paper Private Entrepreneurs In Public Services: A Longitudinal Examination Of Outsourcing and Statization Of Prisons(2011) SANDRO CABRAL; SERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINI; PAULO FURQUIM DE AZEVEDOSome fear that the profit-maximizing orientation of private entrepreneurs conflicts with societal goals expected in the provision of complex public services. Received contractual theories advocate that private involvement in public services will result in cost reductions at the expense of quality. Using prisons as our empirical context, we benefit from an event involving the outsourcing and subsequent statization of correctional facilities in Brazil. Triangulating between quantitative and qualitative information, we do not find evidence of quality deterioration in outsourced prisons and suggest that a key mechanism driving this result is the presence of public supervisors closely working on site with private entrepreneurs in a hybrid governance fashion. We then deliver a set of new propositions that move beyond hazard considerations to examine how the combination of heterogeneous public and private capabilities might yield learning and spillover effects unattainable through pure government management or full-fledged privatization.Working Paper O Impacto de Capital Humano, Capital Social e Práticas Gerenciais na Sobrevivência de Empresas Nascentes: um Estudo com Dados de Pequenas Empresas no Estado de São Paulo(2008) Mizumoto, Fabio Matuoka; RINALDO ARTES; SERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINI; Hashimoto, Marcos; Bedê, Marco AurelioA literatura tem encontrado que firmas menores e mais jovens têm, em geral, maior risco de fechamento do que empresas maiores e já estabelecidas no seu setor. O objetivo da nossa pesquisa é examinar empiricamente o impacto de três fatores que podem prolongar a sobrevivência de empresas nascentes: o capital humano do empreendedor, o seu capital social, e a adoção práticas gerenciais após a nova firma ser aberta. Com base na amostra de 1.961 empresas abertas e registradas na JUCESP (Junta Comercial do Estado de São Paulo) entre os anos de 1999 e 2003, realizamos um estudo de cunho quantitativo para examinar a probabilidade de sobrevivência destas empresas. Algumas variáveis se mostraram estatisticamente significantes para explicar a probabilidade de sobrevivência da empresa nascente – dentre elas, o grau de escolaridade do empreendedor e sua preparação prévia antes de abrir ao negócio (relacionados ao seu capital humano), a existência de pessoas na família com negócios similares (relacionada ao seu capital social) e, principalmente, a adoção de práticas gerenciais tais como a busca de antecipar acontecimentos e a procura por informações relevantes. Estes resultados ressaltam a necessidade de considerar elementos de diferentes abordagens teóricas visando explicar as chances de sobrevivência de novos empreendimentos.Dissertação Sucesso em Contratos Baseados em Resultados: uma Abordagem Comparativa(2024) Caetano, Gabriel Luís LourençoContratos baseados em resultados no âmbito social são parcerias entre diferentes setores, em que os pagamentos a investidores, financiadores e/ou prestadores de serviços dependem do alcance de métricas de resultados sociais predefinidas. Enquanto alguns desses contratos têm sucesso em alcançar suas metas, outros não conseguem atingir os resultados desejados. Este estudo investiga os fatores que contribuem para o sucesso desses contratos, considerando a disponibilidade de recursos, a complexidade dos projetos e o ambiente institucional. Utilizando uma base de dados de contratos implementados globalmente e em diversas áreas de política, a análise é conduzida por meio da técnica de análise comparativa qualitativa de conjunto difuso (fsQCA), com uma amostra de 110 contratos. Os resultados revelam diferentes caminhos para o sucesso em ambientes institucionais diversos, destacando a importância de recursos adequados, como investimento per capita e experiência dos intermediários, e a redução da complexidade, incluin do um menor número de investidores e uma escala menor de beneficiários. Este estudo fornece insights para pesquisadores e gestores interessados no potencial desses contratos ao identificar as condições suficientes para o seu sucesso por meio de uma abordagem sistemática e comparativa com uma amostra diversificada de casosArtigo Científico The nature of the social firm: alternative organizational forms for social value creation and appropriation(2019) SERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINIWorking Paper Meritocracy and Innovation: Is There a Link? Empirical Evidence from Firms in Brazil(2009) Barros, Henrique Machado; SERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINIWe investigate whether meritocracy affects firms’ innovation performance. More specifically, we empirically evaluate the prediction that the use of higher performance-based pay and promotion should lead to a higher percentage of firm revenues coming from innovations in products and services. To test this prediction, we employ a survey of 370 Brazilian firms in a broad range of industries. Our two-stage regressions, devised to account for potential endogeneity, indicate that while the use of performance-based promotion strongly affects innovation, the effect of contingent pay is marginal. Apparently, the long-term feature of promotion-based meritocracy is more effective to tap into individuals’ creativity than is short-term pay. Our study sheds light on the debate about how organizational practices can affect the innovative potential of firms.Capítulo de Livro O uso do aparato estatal em crises: oportunidades e cuidados(2021) SERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINI; Musacchio, AldoWorking Paper Competição Bancária: Comparação do Comportamento de Bancos Públicos e Privados e suas Reações à Crise de 2008(2014) Martins, Tiago Sammarco; ADRIANA BRUSCATO BORTOLUZZO; SERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINIWorking Paper Medindo o desempenho de um parlamento brasileiro: o caso da Câmara Municipal de São Paulo(2013) LUCIANA YEUNG LUK TAI; Dantas, Humberto; SERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINIWorking Paper Strategizing by the Government: Industrial Policy and Sustainable Competitive Advantage(2012) SERGIO GIOVANETTI LAZZARINIDespite the prevalence of active governmental policy devised to foster firms and industries in various countries, the link between industrial policy (IP) and competitive advantage has received scant attention in Strategic Management. I propose a model where IP influences the accumulation and churning of resources and capabilities which can be flexible or specialized. I also introduce the concept of support-adjusted sustainable competitive advantage (SASCA), which occurs if a firm’s observed economic performance is superior to the expected performance of competitors had they received the same array of policies. In my framework, SASCA is created by the interplay of three factors: external integration, geographical specificity, and policy-making capability. Thus, the model enhances our understanding of the determinants of competitive advantage in a context of governmental intervention.Tese Stakeholder Governance and Decision-Making: Dealing with Preference Heterogeneity and Uncertainty(2024) Freire, Vitor de Barros SantosThis dissertation examines mechanisms of strategic stakeholder governance, advancing the understanding of how firms can incorporate diverse stakeholder perspectives in high-level strategic decision-making forums such as corporate boards. Central to this research objective is the understanding that value creation demands governance structures that reconcile heterogeneous stakeholder interests and, at the same time, deal with potentially escalating decision-making costs and promote adaptation to changing circumstances. The dissertation is comprised of three chapters examining the nuanced challenges and mechanisms concerning corporate boards, blending theoretical propositions and empirical testing using laboratory experimental methods. The initial chapter presents a decision-based theory of stakeholder governance. It explores the interplay between stakeholder engagement and decision rights allocation within corporate boards, when facing contingencies like the boundaries on stakeholder claims (the extent of stakeholders' interests considered) and the nature of the decision problem under consideration. The chapter follows a comparative organizational analysis and examines different governance patterns that fit these contingencies to propose a combination of aspects related to the allocation of decision rights, corporate objectives, and deliberation mechanisms aligned with the contingencies to facilitate decision-making and adaptation, resulting in a theory of stakeholder governance explaining the arrangement of decision-making forums to accommodate distinct stakeholder demands. The second chapter empirically examines a specific mechanism of board decision-making under uncertainty. The research investigates conditions in which boards tend to make choices that avoid negative externalities and safeguard vulnerable stakeholders. The chapter tests the hypothesis that when facing uncertain outcomes and divergent opinions, boards following a unanimous rule for decision tend to opt for choices that mitigate negative externalities over higher financial gains. The experimental results show that, under such conditions, boards have a surprisingly strong preference for the alternative that avoids negative externalities, even when it entails lower financial results. The chapter then investigates the factors leading the boards to adopt such a cautious attitude and argues that besides an increased perception of uncertainty in groups, the critical influence of the unanimity rule is likely a main factor. The final chapter, then, delves into the comparative effects of the unanimity rule in comparison with the widely adopted majority decision rule. This chapter builds upon the same behavioral mechanisms discussed in the second chapter and examines the trade-offs between adopting a unanimity rule versus a majority vote. Experimental results show that unanimity enhances the board's tendency towards precautionary decisions and also increases confidence in the collective decision, yet it also necessitates more deliberation efforts. The extra efforts can complicate decision-making in business environments that require prompt decisions, suggesting a critical trade-off between inclusive decision-making and swift decision-making. In sum, this dissertation sheds light on the intricate balance between managing heterogeneous stakeholder demands and dealing with the decision-making costs that emerge when their multiple demands are considered. It offers valuable insights into how governance structures can be designed to manage the tensions between diverse stakeholder interests, the decision-making costs of considering diverse interests, and the need for adaptation in changing business landscapes. The findings underscore the importance of considering both the necessity of inclusiveness regarding stakeholders' interests and the decision-making costs permeating deliberation mechanisms. This dissertation therefore contributes to the evolving literature on stakeholder governance by examining decision-making processes, their underlying theoretical determinants, and the mechanisms that decision-making forums may adopt to reconcile multiple stakeholder demands.