Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/5970
Type: Working Paper
Title: Replacement Cycles, Income Distribution, and Dynamic Price Discrimination
Author: Souza, Eduardo Correia de
Batista, Jorge Chami
Publication Date: 2013
Keywords in original language : intertemporal price discrimination
durable good monopoly
optimal pricing strategy
minimum quality standards
imitation
Abstract: This paper analyses how income distribution, Intellectual Property Rights and other regulatory policies such as minimum quality standards determine pricing strategies in a dynamic context where a monopolist periodically introduces new generations or upgrades of a durable good. This paper differs from Inderst’s (2003) or Koh’s (2006) in that discrimination through quality and screening take place in a context where consumers buy several (not a single) versions of the durable good during a lifetime. It differs from Glass (2001) in that here an equilibrium may emerge in which different consumer types replace their durable generations with different frequencies. Our model’s predictions or stylised facts are illustrated with data from the last Brazilian POF (household budget survey).
Language: Inglês
CNPq Area: Ciências Sociais Aplicadas
Copyright: O INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DO USUÁRIO VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITOR
Appears in Collections:Coleção Insper Working Papers

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