Electoral Rules, Political Competition and Fiscal Expenditures: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities

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Use este identificador para citar ou linkar para este item: https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4231

Tipo de Documento:	Artigo Científico
Título:	Electoral Rules, Political Competition and Fiscal Expenditures: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities
Autor:	Firpo, Sergio Pinheiro Chamon, Marcos Mello, João Manoel Pinho de Pieri, Renan Gomes De
Data da publicação:	2018
Resumo em inglês:	We exploit a discontinuity in the rules of Brazilian mayoral elections to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on fiscal policy choices. In municipalities with fewer than 200,000 voters, mayors are elected under a plurality voting system. In all other municipalities, a runoff election takes place between the top two candidates if neither achieves the majority of votes. Our results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current expenditures, particularly personnel expenditures. The impact is larger when incumbents can run for re-election, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office
Idioma principal:	Inglês
Area do CNPq:	Ciências Humanas
URI:	https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2017.1414184
Licença de uso:	O INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DO USUÁRIO VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITOR.
Notas:	Trabalho Completo
Aparece nas coleções:	Coleção de Artigos Científicos

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