Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4231
Type: Artigo Científico
Title: Electoral Rules, Political Competition and Fiscal Expenditures: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities
Author: Firpo, Sergio Pinheiro
Chamon, Marcos
Mello, João Manoel Pinho de
Pieri, Renan Gomes De
Publication Date: 2018
Abstract: We exploit a discontinuity in the rules of Brazilian mayoral elections to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on fiscal policy choices. In municipalities with fewer than 200,000 voters, mayors are elected under a plurality voting system. In all other municipalities, a runoff election takes place between the top two candidates if neither achieves the majority of votes. Our results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current expenditures, particularly personnel expenditures. The impact is larger when incumbents can run for re-election, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office
Language: Inglês
CNPq Area: Ciências Humanas
URI: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2017.1414184
Copyright: O INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DO USUÁRIO VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITOR.
Notes: Trabalho Completo
Appears in Collections:Coleção de Artigos Científicos

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