Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4303
Type: Artigo Científico
Title: Order with Some Law: Complementarity versus Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements
Author: Lazzarini, Sergio Giovanetti
Miller, Gary J.
Zenger, Todd R.
Publication Date: 2004
Abstract: While some argue that incomplete incentive contracts facilitate the self enforcement of informal dealings, other authors submit that they substitute for or ‘‘crowd out’’ social norms supporting informal arrangements. We use experimental evidence to test these theories by manipulating the extent to which individuals transact repeatedly and the level of contract costs. We find that, by enforcing contractible exchange dimensions, contracts facilitate the self-enforcement of noncontractible dimensions. This complementarity effect is particularly important when repetition is unlikely and thus self-enforcement is difficult. Although our data suggest the existence of reciprocity as an alternative, informal enforcement mechanism, we do not find evidence that contracts substitute for this social norm.
Keywords (english terms): Não informado
Language: Inglês
CNPq Area: Ciências Sociais Aplicadas
Copyright: O INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DOS USUÁRIOS INDIVIDUAIS VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITOR.
Appears in Collections:Coleção de Artigos

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