Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4879
Type: Artigo Científico
Title: Reputation and the flow of information in repeated games
Author: Faingold, Eduardo
Publication Date: 2020
Abstract: Equilibrium payoff bounds from reputation effects are derived for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in which a long-run player interacts frequently with a population of short-run players and the monitoring technology scales with the length of the period of interaction. The bounds depend on the monitoring technology through the flow of information, a measure of signal informativeness per unit of time based on relative entropy. Examples are shown where, under complete information, the set of equilibrium payoffs of the long-run player converges, as the period length tends to zero, to the set of static equilibrium payoffs, whereas when the game is perturbed by a small ex ante probability on commitment types, reputation effects remain powerful in the high-frequency limit.
Keywords (english terms): Reputation
Commitment
Imperfect monitoring
High-frequency repeated games
Language: Inglês
CNPq Area: Ciências Sociais Aplicadas
URI: https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11965
Copyright: O INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DOS USUÁRIOS INDIVIDUAIS VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITOR
Notes: Texto completo
Appears in Collections:Coleção de Artigos Científicos

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