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4. Reputation and the flow of information in repeated games

Type:	Artigo Científico
Title:	Reputation and the flow of information in repeated games
Author:	Faingold, Eduardo
Publication Date:	2020
Abstract:	Equilibrium payoff bounds from reputation effects are derived for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in which a long-run player interacts frequently with a population of short-run players and the monitoring technology scales with the length of the period of interaction. The bounds depend on the monitoring technology through the flow of information, a measure of signal informativeness per unit of time based on relative entropy. Examples are shown where, under complete information, the set of equilibrium payoffs of the long-run player converges, as the period length tends to zero, to the set of static equilibrium payoffs, whereas when the game is perturbed by a small ex ante probability on commitment types, reputation effects remain powerful in the high-frequency limit.
Keywords (english terms):	Reputation Commitment Imperfect monitoring High-frequency repeated games
Language:	Inglês
CNPq Area:	Ciências Sociais Aplicadas
URI:	https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11965
Copyright:	O INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DOS USUÁRIOS INDIVIDUAIS VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITOR
Notes:	Texto completo
Appears in Collections:	Coleção de Artigos Científicos

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