Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4879
Type: | Artigo Científico |
Title: | Reputation and the flow of information in repeated games |
Author: | Faingold, Eduardo |
Publication Date: | 2020 |
Abstract: | Equilibrium payoff bounds from reputation effects are derived for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in which a long-run player interacts frequently with a population of short-run players and the monitoring technology scales with the length of the period of interaction. The bounds depend on the monitoring technology through the flow of information, a measure of signal informativeness per unit of time based on relative entropy. Examples are shown where, under complete information, the set of equilibrium payoffs of the long-run player converges, as the period length tends to zero, to the set of static equilibrium payoffs, whereas when the game is perturbed by a small ex ante probability on commitment types, reputation effects remain powerful in the high-frequency limit. |
Keywords (english terms): | Reputation Commitment Imperfect monitoring High-frequency repeated games |
Language: | Inglês |
CNPq Area: | Ciências Sociais Aplicadas |
URI: | https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11965 |
Copyright: | O INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DOS USUÁRIOS INDIVIDUAIS VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITOR |
Notes: | Texto completo |
Appears in Collections: | Coleção de Artigos Científicos |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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R_Artigo_2020_Reputation and the flow_TC.pdf | R_Artigo_2020_Reputation and the flow_TC | 199.72 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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