Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/6303
Type: Artigo Científico
Title: Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence
Author: Moita, Rodrigo Menon Simões
Paiva, Claudio
Publication Date: 2013
Abstract: The early work of Stigler (1971) treats the regulatory process as the arbitration of conflicting economic and political interests rather than a pure welfare-maximizing effort. This paper builds on these ideas and models the regulatory process as a game where the industry-lobby, consumers-voters, and a regulator-politician interact to define the regulated price, in alternating electoral and non-electoral periods. The equilibrium that emerges consists of a fully rational political price cycle in a regulated industry. Using monthly data for regulated gasoline and electricity prices from Brazil, we find strong evidence pointing towards the existence of electoral price cycles in both markets.
Language: Inglês
CNPq Area: Ciências Exatas e da Terra
Ciências Sociais Aplicadas
URI: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23358338
Copyright: O INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DO USUÁRIO VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITOR.
Appears in Collections:Coleção de Artigos Científicos

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