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https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4231
Tipo de Material: | Artigo Científico |
Titulo: | Electoral Rules, Political Competition and Fiscal Expenditures: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities |
Autor: | Firpo, Sergio Pinheiro Chamon, Marcos Mello, João Manoel Pinho de Pieri, Renan Gomes De |
Fecha de Publicación: | 2018 |
Resumen en ingles: | We exploit a discontinuity in the rules of Brazilian mayoral elections to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on fiscal policy choices. In municipalities with fewer than 200,000 voters, mayors are elected under a plurality voting system. In all other municipalities, a runoff election takes place between the top two candidates if neither achieves the majority of votes. Our results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current expenditures, particularly personnel expenditures. The impact is larger when incumbents can run for re-election, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Area del CNPq: | Ciências Humanas |
URI: | https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2017.1414184 |
Licencias de uso: | O INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DO USUÁRIO VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITOR. |
Notas: | Trabalho Completo |
Aparece en las colecciones: | Coleção de Artigos Científicos |
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero | Descripción | Tamaño | Formato | |
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Artigo_2018_Electoral Rules, Political Competition and Fiscal Expenditures_TC.pdf | Artigo_2018_Electoral Rules, Political Competition and Fiscal Expenditures_TC | 628.68 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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