Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem: https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4231
Tipo de Material: Artigo Científico
Titulo: Electoral Rules, Political Competition and Fiscal Expenditures: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities
Autor: Firpo, Sergio Pinheiro
Chamon, Marcos
Mello, João Manoel Pinho de
Pieri, Renan Gomes De
Fecha de Publicación: 2018
Resumen en ingles: We exploit a discontinuity in the rules of Brazilian mayoral elections to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on fiscal policy choices. In municipalities with fewer than 200,000 voters, mayors are elected under a plurality voting system. In all other municipalities, a runoff election takes place between the top two candidates if neither achieves the majority of votes. Our results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current expenditures, particularly personnel expenditures. The impact is larger when incumbents can run for re-election, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office
Idioma: Inglês
Area del CNPq: Ciências Humanas
URI: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2017.1414184
Licencias de uso: O INSPER E ESTE REPOSITÓRIO NÃO DETÊM OS DIREITOS DE USO E REPRODUÇÃO DOS CONTEÚDOS AQUI REGISTRADOS. É RESPONSABILIDADE DO USUÁRIO VERIFICAR OS USOS PERMITIDOS NA FONTE ORIGINAL, RESPEITANDO-SE OS DIREITOS DE AUTOR OU EDITOR.
Notas: Trabalho Completo
Aparece en las colecciones: Coleção de Artigos Científicos

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